Fr. Charles René Billuart, O.P.

Summary of the Holy Trinity

Summa Summae S. Thomae

Sonnet 3.7 Translation

SUMMARY OF THE HOLY TRINITY

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SUMMARY OF THE SACRED MYSTERY OF THE HOLY TRINITY

FROM SUMMA SUMMAE S. THOMAE SIVE
COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE TOMUS I

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TO THE MOTHER OF GOD

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PROLOUGE

The most learned Charles René Billuart of the Order of Preachers has reduced his theological summa, already published by him and adapted to contemporary academic customs, into a compendium which he entitled "Summa Summae S. Thomae" [Summary of the Summary of St. Thomas], for the benefit and convenience of young students, lest they be overwhelmed by its extensive bulk and subject matter. However, since in this second and briefer work he had primarily in mind the formation of the Moral Theologian, many things are lacking for those who strive to acquire comprehensive theological knowledge, particularly regarding the adequate explanation of dogmatic truths. This deficiency might have seemed addressed by the Theological Institutions of the same Billuart, though augmented and illustrated, which began to be printed in Florence at the Calasanctian Press in 1824; but since the work was suddenly interrupted, disappointing everyone's expectations, we now undertake it again—if it be permitted at last to provide for studious Youth—which, with God's favor, we trust will be completed.

The entire form and method of this work will be as follows: that the Author's Compendium will be committed to print anew with necessary additions faithfully extracted from his larger work, with only occasional notes enclosed in these

signs [] inserted for greater explanation suitable for beginners. There is added, however, at the beginning of the work, some notion of censures or qualifications by which erroneous propositions are commonly condemned, as well as a catalog of propositions condemned up to the present time, an addition that seemed almost necessary. Furthermore, since the Author omits the Treatise on Theological Sources, referring the studious reader to Melchior Cano, who first systematized this part of Theology, this same treatise is established after Theology in general according to theological custom. However, regarding the first five sources, which are of irrefutable Authority, it is composed from what the Author discusses extensively and brilliantly in the treatise on the Rules of Faith; what needs to be added concerning the five latter sources will be taken from another approved Theologian. Nor, for the completion of the work, are other theological treatises omitted which are lacking in the Author's compendium. Thus, the studious reader will have a complete work which, if he diligently turns over in mind and hand, he will find a vigorous and easy method for investigating and confirming truth, for vindicating Faith from errors and the calumnies of heretics.

Notice on the English Translation

This English translation of Rev. Fr. Charles René Billuart's Summary of the Sacred Mystery of the Holy Trinity (from Summa Summae S. Thomae sive Compendium Theologiae, Tomus I, Rome: Crispinus Puccinelli, 1834) has been prepared with the assistance of modern computational translation methods to render this complex theological work accessible to contemporary readers. The digital source

material employed for this translation presents certain challenges that readers should be aware of when consulting this work. The quality of the digitized text varies throughout the document, which occasionally affects the accurate identification of individual characters, particularly in cases involving numerical references and citations. Of particular concern is the potential confusion between Roman numerals and Arabic numbers, where "II" may be misread as "11" or vice versa, and similar ambiguities may occur with other numerical designations. These issues are compounded by the close spacing of characters and the abbreviations typical of 18th-century theological printing, which can result in uncertain readings of critical textual elements.

Given these technical constraints, readers are strongly encouraged to verify all citations, numerical references, and source attributions against the original Latin text, particularly when using this translation for academic or scholarly purposes. The precision required for theological scholarship demands careful attention to such details, which may be compromised by the limitations of the digital reproduction process. This translation should be regarded as an aid to understanding Billuart's theological exposition rather than a definitive scholarly edition. For authoritative reference and citation, readers should consult the original Latin text or other established critical editions. All bibliographical references and doctrinal citations contained herein should be independently verified against reliable sources. The complexity of Billuart's scholastic methodology and technical terminology, developed within the rich tradition of Dominican theology, requires careful study that may be best served by consulting multiple textual witnesses when questions of accuracy arise.

DISSERTATION I.
ON THE TRUTH OF THE MYSTERY OF THE HOLY TRINITY

Article I. A reviewing the principal heresies against the Mystery of the Holy Trinity

There were three principal heresies against this Mystery. The first was that of Sabellius, who denied the distinction of persons. The second was that of Arius, who denied their consubstantiality. The third was that of Macedonius, who attacked the divinity of the Holy Spirit. All heresies in this matter can be traced back to these three principal errors.

Sabellianism

The author of this heresy was Praxeas from Asia at the beginning of the 3rd century. Since he did not distinguish the incarnate Son from the Father, he asserted that the Father was crucified, which is why the adherents of this heresy were called Patripassians. Sabellius, a disciple of Noetus, around the year 257 AD, renewed this heresy and made it more widespread; hence those who defended it were called Sabellians. The error of the Sabellians consisted in acknowledging only one person in God, who nevertheless

was called Father, Son, and Holy Spirit because of different effects or functions: Father as unbegotten and the principle of creation; Son as incarnate; Holy Spirit as sanctifier of souls, just as the same sun is called illuminating, heating, and productive because it has the power to illuminate, heat, and produce—this was the example they used. The error of Photinus, Bishop of Sirmium, was that God must be confessed as solitary in the Jewish manner, that there is no person of the Divine Word or Holy Spirit, but that there is only one operation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Related to the heresy of Sabellius was that of Paul of Samosata, who claimed that the Father was that God who created all things, the Son was merely a man, and the Spirit was that grace which came upon the Apostles. This heresy was condemned in the Council of Antioch in 150 AD, in Alexandria in 319 AD, in Milan in 347 AD, and in Sirmium in 351 AD.

Arianism

Arius of Libya asserted that there is only one true God properly so called, namely the Father, who alone is eternal, alone is true, etc., who begot the only-begotten Son; but this Son or Word is not consubstantial with the Father, but a perfect creature, created from nothing or from non-being; there was a time when he did not exist; he is subject to change; he is called God only by participation and by preeminence of grace. Hence, Arius inverted the hymn of glorification, teaching his followers to sing: "Glory to the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit."

The Arian heresy, with the progression of time, was divided into three sects. The first maintained that the Son of

God was in all respects dissimilar [to the Father], whence they were called Anomoeans, that is, "dissimilar ones." The leaders of this sect were Aetius, Eunomius, and Eudoxius. The second sect was that of the Semi-Arians, who denied the homoousion or that the Son was consubstantial with the Father, but asserted that he was in all things similar, and thus they used the terms katousion and homoiousion, meaning "similar to the Father." The leaders of this faction, among others, were Basil of Ancyra and Macedonius of Constantinople. The third sect was that of the Acacians, named after their leader Acacius, Bishop of Caesarea. This sect proclaimed that the Son was not consubstantial with the Father, nor one of the creatures, but similar, though not in substance or ousia; hence they advocated neither homoousion with the Catholics, nor homoiousion with the Semi-Arians, nor anomoion with the Anomoeans, but homoion, that is, "similar to the Father," as a statue is similar to the person it represents. This heresy was condemned in the Council of Nicaea under St. Sylvester.

Macedonianism

Macedonius, Bishop of Constantinople, around the year 360 AD, began to spread his heresy, asserting that the Holy Spirit is not of the same substance as the Father and the Son, but a minister and creature of both, whence they were also called Pneumatomachi, that is, "fighters against the Spirit." This heresy was condemned in the Second Ecumenical Council, which is the First Council of Constantinople, celebrated in the year 381 AD on the first day of May, in the 15th year of Pope Damasus, during the reign of the Emperors Valentinian, Theodosius the Elder,

and Gratian. In this council, not only the Macedonians, but also the Photinians, Sabellians, Apollinarians, and again the Arians were struck with anathema, as is evident from its first Canon. Also, the Creed that is now sung in the Church was issued, in no way different from the Nicene Creed except in terms of greater explanation, as we shall discuss below.

Socinianism & Other Errors Concerning the Holy Trinity

Under the name of Socinians, we include all those who, around the middle of the 16th century, revived the long-dormant heresies of Sabellius, Arius, and Macedonius. The principal leaders among them were several from the ranks of Lutherans and Calvinists, including Laelius Socinus and Faustus Socinus, Laelius's nephew, a Calvinist from Siena. Although most of these propagated their impious dogmas concerning the Trinity not in one way but in diverse and confused ways, and disputed among themselves, they all agreed in denying the Most Holy Trinity, saying that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are indeed three, but not three persons, nor of the same substance, and that only the Father is the true God. Hence, they were called Trinitarians and new Arians, but more frequently Socinians from Faustus Socinus, who made this sect more celebrated and disseminated it more widely, especially throughout Poland and Transylvania, for which reason they were also called Transylvanians. Among other things, following Sabellius, he taught that in the divine essence there is only one person, the Father, and that it is contradictory for God to be one in essence and three in persons. Following Arius, he taught that the Son of God, or Christ, is neither a divine person nor God, though he may be called God metaphorically and improperly because of his

sublime power, which is shared from the true God, the Father. Following Macedonius, he taught that the Holy Spirit is indeed a power or efficacy of God, but it does not follow from this that he is a divine person.

Among those who err regarding the Trinity, we can also include Gentiles, Jews, and Muslims who, while acknowledging that God exists, deny that he is three in persons. "It is impossible," says Muhammad, "for God to generate a Son, because he lacks a wife." A sentiment worthy of its author!

The error of Abelard consisted in dividing the divine attributes among the persons, not by adaptation or appropriation, as is done in theology, but by partition and assignment. Thus, he said that omnipotence belongs to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit, and because wisdom serves power by directing it, but goodness does not, he therefore said that the Father is full power, the Son is a certain power, and the Holy Spirit is no power. To these can also be added Abbot Joachim, who around the year 1190 asserted that the three persons were not one essence numerically, but collectively; and Raymond Lull, who said that the three Persons are three essences, hence also the Tritheists who assert three Gods.

Heretics who accept the Scriptures must be refuted by their authority; likewise, Jews by the Old Testament; Gentiles by the motives of credibility of our Religion and by resolving the contradictions they object to; whereas Muslims, who by the precept of their founder are most ignorant, are not led by the weight of reasons, so that scarcely any opportunity for disputation with them remains. Nevertheless, St. John Damascene advises in his book on heresies, near the end, that they should be asked by what

testimony, by what miracles, by what authority they consider Muhammad to be a true Prophet, as was established for the world concerning Moses and the other Prophets, as well as concerning Jesus of Nazareth himself, whom Muhammad honors, though not as God. They respond that Muhammad received what he sanctioned from God without witnesses while he was sleeping. Very well, but how do they know this? And why do they give credence to a vile man narrating his dreams, without witnesses, in a matter of such importance, especially when he himself in his writings forbade anything to be written or done without arbiters, as Damascene says in the cited place? Moreover, since he in his Quran bears witness to the Gospel, one can argue against his followers from this and from other Scriptures; for there is no reason why they should accept the Gospel in one part and reject it in another, or why they should say that the Gospel is corrupted here but not there, unless they clearly prove it, which is impossible for them. But if they admitted no Scripture, they should be dealt with as with pagans, and they would have to be refuted through miracles and extrinsic testimonies of the credibility of our Religion, and furthermore, one would need to show them the absurdity of their Religion, which is in no way consonant with reason.

Article II. On the truth and existence of the Mystery of the Holy Trinity

This mystery consists in there being one God numerically and individually in three persons, or one and the same individual divine essence in three really distinct persons: the unbegotten Father, the begotten Son, and the proceeding Holy Spirit. To prove this, we must establish both

the distinction and plurality of Persons against the Sabellians, and their consubstantiality against the Arians and Macedonians. Thus:

§ I. The distinction or plurality of persons against the sabellians is asserted from scripture.

Sabellius, as I have already said, acknowledged only one Person in God, or if you prefer, three only in the sense that one man is said to play multiple roles. Thus he said that one and the same Person is called Father in creation, Son in incarnation, and Holy Spirit in the sanctification of souls—perversely confusing that from which a name is imposed with that which the name is imposed to signify. For although the term "person" derives its origin from "personating" or representing multiple persons, as happens in comedies, it is nevertheless used to signify different supposita, as I will explain below. Therefore, against these and the Socinians, who say that the Holy Spirit is not a person but an accident, or a virtue and efficacy of God:

The assertion is proven. Scripture repeatedly posits in God a certain distinction and plurality that can only be that of persons, and not merely of attributes, offices, or effects—which are all evasions of the Sabellians and Socinians. Therefore. The antecedent is proven:

1. According to Scripture, there is in God true Paternity and true Filiation: "The Lord said to me: You are my Son; today I have begotten you" (Ps. 2). The Apostle in Acts 13:34 testifies that these words are spoken of Christ and the true Son of God, thereby proving the divinity and resurrection of Christ, which is also evident from the words that follow: "I will give you the nations as your inheritance

and the ends of the earth as your possession"—which can apply to none other than Christ. "I came from the Father" (John 16). "The only-begotten who is in the bosom of the Father" (John 1). "My Father will love him, and we will come to him" (John 14). "That we may be in his true Son" (1 John, last chapter), and continuously elsewhere. But Paternity and Filiation necessarily require the distinction of supposita and persons, as St. Thomas teaches (Contra Gentiles, Book 4, ch. 5). For neither a foot nor a hand, nor an accident such as color or heat, nor different attributes or different offices of the same person, nor different connotations of the same person in relation to various effects, is called Father or Son; rather, only he is and is called Son who is a person really proceeding from another in the likeness of his nature. Therefore.

2. In God is posited a procession of one from another with terms by which only persons are signified, not properties or offices or effects, such as "I," "you," "he," "this one," "another," etc. "Today I have begotten you" (Ps. 2). "I proceeded from God" (John 8). "This is my beloved Son" (Luke 9). Concerning the Holy Spirit: "He will glorify me, because he will receive of mine" (John 16). "He will give you another Paraclete" (John 14). For neither a foot nor a hand, goodness nor wisdom can say, "I did," "you do." Nor can the same person according to different offices or effects say of itself, "he did," "another did," "you do," "I made you," "I begot you," "I proceeded from you," "he will glorify me," "he will receive of mine," etc. Therefore.

3. In God is posited the society of several, whereby one is with another: "I am not alone, because the Father is with me" (John 16). But this plurality or number according to society is necessarily understood of distinct persons, not

of the same person by reason of different attributes, offices, or effects. Therefore.

4. Christ in John 8 says to the Jews: "In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true, etc. I am one who bears witness concerning myself, and the Father who sent me bears witness concerning me." Where Christ, because in human affairs the testimony is true where there are multiple persons testifying, thereby proves that his testimony is true because he and the Father testify about him. Therefore, either Christ's entire argument falls apart, or he and the Father are distinct persons, not the same person having different offices, attributes, or effects. Therefore.

5. Finally, and what completely settles the matter against Sabellius, Scripture posits in God plurality and number before the Incarnation, before the sanctification of souls, and before the creation of the world: "In the beginning was the Word" (John 1). "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning" (Prov. 8). "Glorify me, Father, with the glory that I had with you before the world existed" (John 17). Likewise, plurality is posited in relation to the same effect: "Whatever he (the Father) does, the Son does likewise" (John 5). "I was with him forming all things" (Prov. 8). "All things were made through him" (John 1). "Upholding all things by the word of his power" (Heb. 1). "Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature... And all things were created through him and in him" (Col. 1). Therefore, Sabellius was completely wrong when he said that plurality is posited in divine things only by reason of diverse effects, and that the same person is called Father insofar as he creates, Son insofar as he is incarnated, Holy Spirit insofar as he sanctifies souls.

And specifically concerning the Holy Spirit, whom the Socinians want to be merely an accident or quality, namely, the virtue and efficacy of God:

1. In Matthew 3, Mark 1, and Luke 3, the history of Christ's baptism is described, in which three persons are mentioned: the Son who is baptized, the Father who says, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," and the Holy Spirit, of whom it is said: "And the Holy Spirit descended in bodily form like a dove upon him," and "Christ saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and coming upon him." But it is proper to a person, not to an accident or quality, to assume bodily form, just as we read that Angels showed themselves in human form. Therefore. However, it should be noted against the Socinians that we do not conclude that he is one person from the fact that he descended in the form of one dove, but from the fact that he descended in the form of a dove, we conclude that he is a person, because it is proper to a person to assume a personal form, and it would be absurd to say that accidents or qualities assume such forms. Whether he assumes one or more forms is irrelevant, just as whether there is one or multiple images of a man, there is still only one man.

2. In Matthew 28, Christ commands his disciples to baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. But it would be ridiculous for someone to be said to be baptized in the name of some quality, and just as the Father and the Son are persons, as the Socinians concede, so too is the Holy Spirit, who is associated with them. Therefore.

3. In John 14, Christ says: "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete (or Comforter)," where "another" clearly indicates a distinct person. Therefore.

4. Actions that are proper only to persons are attributed in Scripture to the Holy Spirit: 1. Speaking (Matt. 10:20); 2. Teaching (John 14:26); 3. Giving testimony (John 15:26); 4. Foretelling future events (John 16:13); 5. Understanding the deep things of God (1 Cor. 2:10); 6. Commanding that some be taken into apostolic ministry and establishing them in that rank (Acts 13:2); 7. Distributing gifts of grace as he wills (1 Cor. 12:11). But these actions are proper only to persons. Therefore.

For solving objections, note:

1. From the fact that some expressions in Scripture are sometimes figurative in certain places, it is wrong to infer that they are always and everywhere figurative. Rather, from the subject matter and the things being discussed, from the circumstances, from what precedes and follows, it must be judged whether Scripture is speaking figuratively or not. Figurative expressions are used when the matter is clear and there is no danger of error; and it is clear to everyone that charity, law, sin, blood, water, and similar things, which in Scripture are said to speak and testify, are not persons. But the word "Spirit" denotes substance, and when things proper to persons are attributed to it, everyone is led to believe it is a person. This is so true that all Christians and heretics other than Sabellians and Socinians firmly believe the Holy Spirit is a person. Therefore, if what Scripture says about the Holy Spirit were to be understood in a metaphorical sense, God would have failed his Church by providing an open occasion for error in so difficult a matter.

2. Metaphors by which actions of persons are attributed in Scripture to charity (1 Cor. 13), sin (Rom. 7),

law (Rom. 3), water, blood (1 John 5), and similar things, are used very rarely and incidentally. But actions of persons are constantly and universally attributed to the Holy Spirit. Metaphors are used when teaching and arguing, but rarely or never when simply narrating events. St. Luke in Acts 13 straightforwardly and simply narrates: "The Holy Spirit said, 'Set apart for me Saul and Barnabas for the work to which I have called them.'" And in chapter 10: "The Spirit said to him (namely, Peter), 'Behold, three men are looking for you. Rise therefore, go down, and go with them, doubting nothing, for I have sent them.'" Such simple narratives, with the addition of the pronouns "I," "me," clearly demonstrate that the Holy Spirit is a person who commands, calls, sends, etc.

3. Finally, although gifts, virtues, and graces are sometimes expressed in Scripture by the name of the Holy Spirit, because they are from him, nevertheless, to avoid any room for error, the Holy Spirit himself is often distinguished from them in Scripture, which completely overthrows the Socinians. Thus in Luke 4: "Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit." Acts 1: "You shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you." 1 Corinthians 12: "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit... To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit, to another faith in the same Spirit... All these things one and the same Spirit works, distributing to each one individually as he wills." I omit many other examples, some of which will be mentioned when we discuss consubstantiality.

§ II. The Consubstantiality of Persons Against the Arians and Macedonians is Asserted from Scripture.

Note: the consubstantiality of persons can be understood in two senses: 1. That they are of the same and individual nature, which is unmultiplied and undivided in them—this is the Catholic understanding; 2. That they are of the same nature indeed, but only specifically, divided and multiplied in them, as two supposita of human nature—this is the error of paganism that admits a plurality of gods, and the Semi-Arians seemed to incline to this when they said the Son was similar to the Father in substance, though they did not dare to assert it directly. Nor did the pure Arians defend this sense, as it is a manifest error plainly contrary to Scripture and reason, as we saw regarding polytheism. Therefore, both they and the Macedonians denied the consubstantiality of persons because they believed that some of them—Arians regarding the Son, Macedonians regarding the Holy Spirit—did not possess true divinity but were of created nature. It remains, therefore, to prove the divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit (for the Father's divinity was never doubted), which done, their consubstantiality with the Father in the Catholic sense is proven. For if the Son and Holy Spirit are true God as the Father is, there will certainly be in them one and undivided divinity, even according to the Arians and Macedonians, who hold with us that there is only one God. Hence:

The Consubstantiality or Divinity of the Son Against the Arians.

Proof: He is God and consubstantial with God the Father:

1. Who in Scripture is called God in the same way as the Father, or to whom divinity is attributed in the same way as to the Father;

2. Who is asserted to be equal to God the Father;

3. To whom the same power and virtue as God the Father is conceded;

4. To whom the same worship, the same adoration as to the Father is offered;

5. Whose superiority over every creature is asserted, and from whom every inferiority of creature is removed.

But this is the case with the Son in divine matters. Therefore. The major premise is evident, for by no clearer indications can divinity be declared. Thus I prove the first part of the minor premise:

1. From the Old Testament, Psalm 109 says, "The Lord said to my Lord, sit at my right hand," where David calls the Son Lord equally with the Father; therefore, God. For this supreme notion of lordship is founded in Deity. Christ himself used this passage in Matthew 22 to prove his divinity. Peter in Acts 2 and Paul in Hebrews 1: "To which of the angels did he ever say: 'Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies your footstool'? Are they not all ministering spirits, etc.?" As if to say: he who is called Lord and sits at the right hand of God is not, in relation to God, a minister and inferior, as all creatures are; therefore, he is not a creature, but equal to God and true God. Isaiah 45, speaking of Christ: "Truly you are a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Savior." And Baruch 3: "This is our God, and no other shall be accounted of in comparison with him," and he adds: "Afterward he was seen upon earth, and conversed with men."

From the New Testament: John 1: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"; God indeed, with whom the Word is, namely the true and highest God. 1 John, last chapter: "That we may be in his true Son. This is the true God and eternal life." John

20: Thomas says to Christ, "My Lord and my God." Romans 9: "Christ... who is over all, God blessed forever." Titus 2: "Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ." If therefore Christ is true God, God over all, the great God, he is God not merely by participation, adoption, or imitation.

2. The second part of the minor premise is proven: Philippians 2: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God." Colossians 2: "In Christ dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily," that is, truly and not symbolically. John 16: "All things that the Father has are mine." And in John 17, he says to the Father: "All mine are yours, and yours are mine." But where all that is in one is found in another, there is equality; therefore, the Son is equal to God the Father; therefore truly God, otherwise he would not be equal but infinitely distant and unequal.

3. The third part of the minor premise is proven: John 1: "All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing." Colossians 1: "All things were created through him and in him, and he is before all, and in him all things consist." Hebrews 1: "Upholding all things by the word of his power." John 5: "Whatever he does," namely the Father, "the Son does likewise." Here the very same power is attributed to the Son as to the Father, and consequently the same nature, both because virtue or power follows the form and nature of a thing, and because omnipotence belongs to God alone.

4. The fourth part of the minor premise is proven: John 5: "That all may honor the Son just as they honor the Father. Whoever does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him." Psalm 71: "All kings shall adore him, all nations shall serve him." Psalm 96: "Adore him, all you

his angels," which the Apostle in Hebrews 1 understands of the Son. In Scripture, adoration is never commanded except for the true God. The Fathers, with the Apostle in Hebrews 1, also emphasize the already cited verse "sit at my right hand," which signifies equality of honor. For as St. Chrysologus observes, just as the Father says to the Son, "Sit at my right hand," afterward the Father is said to sit at the right hand of the Son, "The Lord at your right hand," to signify that both are of equal degree of honor. Thus "at the right hand" (says the aforementioned Father, Sermon 58:4) "sits the Son, so that the Father does not sit at the left; the divine session is unique and singular, where the supernal power receives nothing sinister."

5. The fifth part of the minor premise is clear from what has been said. For if the Son is true God with the Father and equal to him, if all creatures were made through him and consist in him, if finally he is worshipped with the same honor as the Father, then he is superior to all creatures. Hence Scripture also establishes in him, as in the Father, the notion of ultimate end and blessed life. John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." And 1 John, last chapter: "This is the true God and eternal life."

The Consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit Against the Macedonians

1. The divinity of the Holy Spirit is proven by the same five means. First, He is expressly named God in Acts 5, where Peter says to Ananias: "Why has Satan tempted your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit? You have not lied to men, but to God." In 1 Corinthians: "There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God who works all in all." And afterward it is added: "But all these things the one and the

same Spirit works," where the one who is called Spirit is God. The same Lord of hosts who says in Isaiah 6, "Go and say to this people: 'Hearing, you shall hear and not understand,'" is called the Holy Spirit by Paul in the last chapter of Acts: "Well did the Holy Spirit speak through Isaiah saying, 'Go to this people and say to them: "With your ears you will hear and not understand."'" Therefore the Socinians lie when they say that the Holy Spirit is nowhere called God in Scripture.

2. Equality in nature is attributed to Him in 1 John, last chapter: "And these three are one." In Matthew 28, equality in dignity: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." In immensity, Wisdom 1: "The Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and that which contains all things has knowledge of the voice." In all knowledge, 1 Corinthians 2: "The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God." And further: "No one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God."

3. Divine power and virtue are attributed to Him. Psalm 103: "Send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created, and you shall renew the face of the earth." And Psalm 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all their power by the Spirit of His mouth." Likewise, the resurrection of the dead, the sanctification of souls, the governance of the Church, and the greatest of all wonders, the work of the Incarnation, are everywhere attributed to the Holy Spirit: Luke 1: "The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you," where the Holy Spirit and the power of the Most High are made equal.

4. The majesty of God and divine honor are attributed to Him. 1 Corinthians 6: "Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you... glorify and bear God in your body?" Here the Holy Spirit is

again called God, and a temple is attributed to Him, which is proper only to divinity. Hence such veneration is due to Him that injuries done to Him are injuries against God and are called unforgivable. Hebrews 10 and Matthew 12: "Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven," etc. Hence the glory of the ultimate end and beatitude is attributed to Him, 1 Peter 1: "The Holy Spirit sent from heaven, whom the angels desire to look upon." From these it is clear that He is superior to all creatures. We omit many other testimonies, which can easily be assigned to one of these five categories.

§ III. The Plurality and Consubstantiality of Persons Simultaneously Proven from Scripture

From the Old Testament

Up to this point we have proven the plurality and consubstantiality of the persons separately; now we present scriptural testimonies that prove both simultaneously. Genesis 1: "Let us make man in our image and likeness" - there is plurality; and immediately afterward, "He created man in His image" - there is unity. Psalm 66: "May God, our God, bless us; may God bless us" - there is number; and lest the Psalmist seem to assert three Gods by naming God three times, he immediately adds: "Let all the ends of the earth fear Him." And similarly in many other places.

From the New Testament

Matthew 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." With these words, the unity of essence is designated by saying singularly "in the name," not "in the names," and the Trinity of persons by saying "of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." Second, 1 John 5:7: "There are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one." In this most compelling testimony, the Socinians challenge two things: the authenticity of the text and its meaning.

Regarding the authenticity of the text, they say that this verse in 1 John 5:7 is spurious because: 1) it is not found in the more ancient and most approved manuscripts; 2) it was not cited by Athanasius, Hilary, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Gregory Nazianzen, and others against the Arians and Sabellians, although it would have been most suitable for refuting them. To the first objection, we admit that this verse, either entirely or in part, is not found in some ancient manuscripts, but it is found in many more ancient manuscripts of the best quality. That it is not found in a few manuscripts could have happened: 1) through the perfidy of the Arians, who erased this text as too contrary to their error, as Jerome testifies in his Prologue to the Catholic Epistles (if indeed this Prologue is Jerome's, which critics now dispute). But be that as it may, Ambrose often reproaches the Arians with this type of fraud in Book 1 on Faith, chapter 15; Book 3, chapter 16; Book 3 on the Holy Spirit, chapter 10. 2) This omission could have occurred through the copyist's error, who, upon reaching these words in the seventh verse: "There are three who give testimony," through an eye slip, jumped to the eighth verse, where the same words are repeated. This kind of error is frequent among copyists when the same

words are repeated with little or no intervening text. Moreover, our Vulgate Edition was made according to the copies that were commonly used by the faithful everywhere. These are much more difficult to corrupt because of their daily use and the certain danger of detecting fraud, and therefore deserve much greater faith than those hidden in the corners of libraries, where they are open to fraud and adulteration through the carelessness or malice of copyists.

To the second objection, namely that several Fathers did not cite this verse against heretics: We respond that many did cite it. It was cited by Tertullian in his book against Praxeas, chapter 25; St. Cyprian in his book on The Unity of the Church, not far from the beginning; Idacius Clarus in the 4th century, or according to others, Vigilius of Thapsus in the 5th century, in his book against the Arian Varimadum, chapter 5; Eugenius of Carthage in his Explanation of the Catholic Faith, subscribed to by almost 400 bishops and presented to Huneric, the Arian king of the Vandals, in the year 484, as reported by Victor Vitensis in Book 3 on the African Persecution, and Gennadius in his book on Ecclesiastical Writers, chapter 97; Jerome in his prologue to the Catholic Epistles. Also, according to Bellarmine in Book 1 on Christ, chapter 6: St. Athanasius in his book to Theophilus on the Unity of the Deity of the Trinity, the author of Athanasius's disputation at the Council of Nicaea, and Fulgentius in his book against the objections of the Arians, toward the end. This positive evidence certainly prevails over the Socinians' negative argument. Hence, the fact that we do not read this verse as having been cited by some of the ancients in their writings either truly or probably happened because they came across a defective codex, or

because not all their writings have come down to us, or they were corrupted by enemies of the faith.

Regarding the meaning of this verse, the Socinians say that these words, "And these three are one," do not signify unity of nature or substance, but unity of testimony, because in the following eighth verse it is likewise said of the spirit, water, and blood: "And these three are one," which is not understood as unity of nature, but unity of testimony, insofar as they agree in the same testimony about Christ, that he is the truth, just as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We respond: 1) These particles of the eighth verse, "And these three are one," are missing in many Latin codices. The Louvain correctors count 15 in which they are not read; Innocent III in the decretal, which is extant in the Third Decretal, title 41, chapter In quadam 8, says that in most codices, likely Latin ones, they are not at all found. Greek codices do have them, but not as they are reported, but thus: "And these three agree in one," that is, they agree in one testimony. Hence it is rightly presumed that through Arian fraud, or scribal carelessness in the Latin codices in which these words are read, they slipped in. However, even if our Vulgate does not read it so, it must nevertheless be interpreted to correspond to the Greek original, so that the sense is that the spirit, water, and blood concur in testifying to the same thing, namely that Christ is true man. And although in both verses there is a certain parity in giving testimony, it is not necessary that there be parity in the signification of these words: "And these three are one." We respond: 2) Given that these words express parity, indeed this parity is found since these three things, spirit, water, and blood, are in some way substantially one. Thus let the sense be: the spirit, water, and blood testified about Christ during

the Passion: the spirit when he cried out and expired, the blood and water flowing from his side, and these three are substantially one, that is, they pertain to one and the same human substance in Christ, just as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit pertain to one and the same divine substance, with this difference, however, that this divine substance is supremely simple and one, while the human substance is composite.

John 10: "I and the Father are one." "I and the Father" - behold the distinction of persons; "are one" - consubstantiality. Hence Augustine in Tract 36 on chapter 8 of John says: "What he said 'one,' frees you from Arius. What he said 'are,' frees you from Sabellius." The Fathers especially pressed this passage against heretics. Therefore it is worthwhile to explain more clearly all its force and to reject the evasions of heretics. Thus, in that place, Christ, wishing to prove that his divinity is true, which was the only question among the Jews, premises that what the Father had given him is greater than all things, namely divinity. For speaking of his sheep, he says: "No one shall snatch them out of my hand. My Father who gave them to me is greater than all, and no one can snatch them out of my Father's hand." As if he were saying, just as no one can snatch my sheep out of my Father's hand, so neither out of mine, because I am equal and consubstantial with him; for what he gave me is greater than all, and therefore is divinity itself, otherwise it would not be what is greater, nor would the conclusion be valid that just as no one can snatch from the Father's hand, so neither from his. Hence in the following, explaining himself more clearly, he adds: "I and the Father are one." This certainly, if it is not understood of complete unity in substance, weakens what he had said before, that what was given to him by the

Father is greater than all, and that no one can snatch from his hand, because no one can snatch from the Father's hand.

That this is the sense of Christ's words was clearly understood by the Jews, since they therefore wanted to stone him and accused him of blasphemy, that he made himself God. For it is added there: "The Jews therefore took up stones to stone him." And a little later: "For a good work we do not stone you, but for blasphemy; and because you, being a man, make yourself God." Nevertheless, neither Christ nor the Evangelist corrected this opinion of the Jews as false; rather, on the contrary, Christ confirms what he had said before, according to their opinion, from his works, saying: "If I do not do the works of my Father, do not believe me. But if I do, even if you do not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in the Father," that is, as he had said before, "I and the Father are one" in divine nature. For what is one with another by unity only, or by concord of affection and will, as heretics interpret, is not properly said to be in the other, nor to be one simply, as we said above. Then Christ explains that in calling himself the Son of God, he is not blasphemous, and he proves this by an argument not from similarity, but from the lesser to the greater, as if saying: The Law calls those "gods" to whom the word of God came, and it contains no blasphemy; therefore, a fortiori, it is not blasphemy for me to call myself the Son of God, who am specially sanctified and sent into the world by the Father. Having dispelled the charge of blasphemy from his words, he immediately returns to the proof of his divinity through works, as we have seen. Moreover, the Jews understood these last words of Christ, like the previous ones, indeed as confirming the previous ones, according to the same sense of the unity of nature,

since they therefore again wished to lay hands on him, for the Evangelist immediately adds: "They sought therefore to seize him, and he escaped from their hands." Hence Augustine in Tract 48 on John says: "Behold, the Jews understood what the Arians do not understand; for they were angry precisely because they realized that 'I and the Father are one' cannot be said except where there is equality of the Father and the Son."

For the solution of other objections, it should be noted that it is common for Scripture to propose examples from both natural and divine things for moral purposes without intending complete parity. Thus it is said in Matthew 7: "Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect," where the sense is that we should strive through grace, insofar as possible, to imitate the perfection of the Father, not that our perfection should be infinite and essential, like the perfection of the Father. Similarly, when he says in Matthew 10: "Be wise as serpents and simple as doves," he does not want us to become serpents and doves naturally, but that we should learn prudence and simplicity from the example of the serpent and the dove. Thus, therefore, concludes St. Athanasius, when Christ said, "that they may be one, as we also are one," it was not so that we would be what he is, but according to our nature, and insofar as possible, that we might borrow from there a formula and likeness... He by nature is one with his Father, but we are made one among ourselves in affection and spirit, having as an archetype and exemplar the unity of the Son with the Father.

What could be more explicit than that passage in John 1: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God," as we have already considered? Hence Ambrose in Book 1 on the Trinity,

chapter 5, elegantly says: "Our fisherman has excluded all heresies in this brief chapter: for what was in the beginning is not enclosed by time, not preceded by beginning. Therefore, let Arius be silent. What was with God is not confused by mixture but is distinguished by the solid perfection of the Word remaining with the Father, that Sabellius may be mute. And the Word was God; therefore this Word is not in the utterance of speech, but in that designation of heavenly power, that Photinus may be confuted. That which was in the beginning with God teaches the inseparable unity of eternal divinity in the Father and the Son, that Eudoxius and Eunomius may be ashamed."

The conclusion is proven from tradition. The Holy Fathers, even in the first three centuries before the Council of Nicaea, expressed this faith in their writings. In the 1st century: Hermas, Paul's disciple, in the work called "The Shepherd," book 3, similitude 5 and 9; St. Clement, Paul's co-worker and Peter's successor in the Roman See, in his Epistle to the Corinthians n. 16 and n. 161; St. Dionysius the Areopagite, another disciple of St. Paul, in his book on the Divine Names, chapter 1; St. Ignatius Martyr, a hearer of John the Evangelist, in his Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Magnesians. In the 2nd century: St. Polycarp, another disciple of St. John the Evangelist, and also of St. Ignatius, Bishop of Smyrna, and with him the whole Church of Smyrna in the Epistle which they wrote about the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp to the Churches of Pontus, as found in Eusebius, book 4 of History, chapter 15; St. Justin Martyr in Apology 2; Athenagoras, a Christian philosopher in his apology to the Emperors; St. Irenaeus, a disciple of St. Polycarp, Bishop of Lyons and Martyr, book 1, Pedagogue chapter 6; Tertullian against Praxeas chapter 2, and in his

book on Modesty chapter 21; St. Cyprian on the Unity of the Church chapter 4, whose testimonies have been related in our larger Work. Finally, in the 4th century, at the Council of Nicaea in the year 325 against Arius, and at the Council of Constantinople in the year 381 against Macedonius, the Catholic Faith concerning the Trinity and consubstantiality of the persons in one and undivided God was asserted, which all the faithful unanimously profess in the Symbol that the Church sings.

For the solution of objections from the authority of scripture against the truth and existence of the Holy Trinity, the following points, if correctly noted, are sufficient, beyond what we have noted above. 1. The words "one" and "alone" in those passages of scripture where it is asserted that God is one, that he is alone, exclude the multiplicity of divinity, such as the pagans imagined, not the true Trinity of persons subsisting in one and the same divinity. 2. The spirit of someone is spoken of in many ways. Sometimes it is taken for his whole essence, as when we say the spirit of an angel; sometimes for part of the essence, as when the soul is called the spirit of man; sometimes for a person distinct from the one whose spirit it is said to be, as in Revelation 3, where angels are called the Spirits of God, and they denote distinct Persons. In the subject matter, however, if the Spirit of God is taken absolutely for the nature of God, it is not a person distinct from him; but if it is taken relatively and notionally, it is a distinct person. Of which more below. 3. The procession of the Word is called sometimes generation, sometimes creation, so that we attribute to it whatever is perfection in these and remove what is imperfection, which is according to St. Thomas in Book 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 8.

From this it follows: 1) that when the Son is called wisdom firstborn before every creature (if this is not to be understood of wisdom in general as it presides over works of ingenuity, which Solomon introduces as speaking by prosopopoeia, as if it were a person), it does not signify that he is the first of creatures, but that he is begotten before any creature was made; for elsewhere he is called the only-begotten of God and the Father. How could he be only-begotten if he were one of the creatures? 2) that "to create" is sometimes taken generally for the production of a thing according to substance. 3) In some places of Scripture, the Father alone is called God, not to the exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit, but to the exclusion of false gods; or the Father is called God rather than the Son or the Holy Spirit by appropriation. 4) The Greek Fathers say that the Father is greater than the Son, not in terms of absolute and properly called greatness, by reason of some essential property that would be in the Father and not in the Son, but in terms of improperly called greatness by reason of origin; so that the Father is said to be greater than the Son insofar as he is prior to him in origin. However, these locutions of the Fathers should not be used frequently, as Augustine notes in Book 4 on the Trinity, chapter 20. Moreover, the greatness of the Father over the Son is also to be understood of Christ as man. 5) The Holy Fathers of the first three centuries before the rise of Arianism, with the possible exception of Origen, about whose opinion on this mystery scholars debate, although they held the correct faith concerning the substance of this mystery, it should nevertheless be noted what Jerome wrote about them (Apology 2 against Rufinus): "I will not immediately judge them heretics: for it can happen that they either erred simply, or wrote in another sense, or their

writings were gradually corrupted by unskilled copyists, or certainly before Arius, like a noonday demon, was born in Alexandria, some spoke innocently and less cautiously, and in ways that could not avoid the calumny of perverse men." 6) When something is said of the Spirit that is not suitable to God but only to a creature, it is to be understood either of the wind, which is also called spirit, as in Exodus 15, "Your spirit blew, and the sea covered them"; or of the gifts of grace and virtues, which are called the Spirit of God, Joel 2, "I will pour out my Spirit"; or of angels, whether good or evil, or of our souls, which are spiritual creatures and are called spirits. 7) If Sacred Scripture says that the Holy Spirit asks, or that all things were made through the Word, the first is to be understood in a causal sense, not a formal one, as St. Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologica, 2-2, q. 83, a. 10, following St. Augustine; so that the Spirit does not himself ask, but makes us ask. Nor does it follow that the whole Trinity or the Father or the Son must also be said in this sense to ask, because although the grace of prayer is truly the work of the whole Trinity, it is nevertheless appropriated to the Holy Spirit, to whom, indeed, goodness and our sanctification are appropriated. As for the second, it is to be understood that all things of different natures were made through the Word, otherwise it would follow that the Father also was made through the Word. 8) The Church in the earlier centuries directed prayers to the Father alone, not because it believed the Son and the Holy Spirit to be devoid of divinity, but because the Father, since he is the font of all divinity, is said by appropriation to act the person of God, the Son is held as mediator, the Holy Spirit as the author of our prayers.

Objection from reason against the entire Mystery. This Mystery contradicts several principles known by the light of nature, and first, this one: "Things that are identical to a third thing are identical to each other." For the Persons are identified with the Divine Essence, and yet they are really distinguished from each other. 2. This principle is not preserved: "Nothing produces its own being." 3. It overturns this principle: "A Person renders nature incommunicable to another supposit." Therefore, this Mystery is against reason, and hence impossible. 2. I deny the antecedent. To the first, I respond 1: this axiom is to be understood of those things that are the same as a third thing, in reality and in concept, which is explained in two senses. The first sense is that the third thing is not virtually multiple, but that the extremes are united to it under the same formality and concept, not under a different one. Hence, although action is the same as motion, and similarly passion, it does not follow that action and passion are the same, because in action is imported a respect as that from which is motion in the mobile, but in passion as that which is from another. Similarly, although Paternity is the same according to reality with the Divine Essence, and similarly Filiation, nevertheless these two in their proper notions import opposite respects, hence they are distinguished from each other. Thus the Doctor. The second sense is that the extremes are so identified with a third thing that they are not distinguished from it by a concept with a foundation in reality, not so, however, that the distinction of concept with a foundation in reality between the extremes and the middle positively and always infers a real distinction of the extremes among themselves, otherwise a syllogism could only be made with synonyms, which is false, nor did the holy Doctor say so, whom see here q. 20, a., but only

permissively, when it happens that the extremes are virtually distinguished from the middle, through notions or formalities importing opposition between themselves. For by the very fact that the extremes differ from the middle by a concept with a foundation in reality, they can, on that account by which they differ from the middle, import some opposition between themselves, say relative, and then by reason of that opposition be really distinguished from each other, although they are really identified with the middle, with which they have no opposition. And so it happens in God. For paternity and filiation are so virtually distinguished from the essence that on that account they import notions that are relatively opposed to each other but not to the essence, whence it happens that they are the same in reality with the essence, and yet really distinct from each other.

That you may understand this more profoundly, note carefully that it is proper to an infinite thing to identify things to itself while preserving their formal notions, when they do not imply imperfection. Thus, e.g., the formal notion of wisdom, which is to know things through the highest causes, also the formal notions of justice, mercy, etc., are most perfectly preserved in God notwithstanding their identity with the essence; similarly, therefore, the formal notion of relation must be perfectly preserved in him, notwithstanding its identity with the essence; but the proper notion of relation is to be opposed to its correlative, and to be really distinguished from it, and therefore divine relations, notwithstanding their identity with the essence, relatively oppose each other, and by reason of this opposition are really distinguished from each other. If you consider these things well, you will easily solve the instances that can be opposed.

Some other Thomists also explain this principle differently, saying that it is verified only when the extremes are united adequately to one finite third thing, and not incommunicable to things really distinct, but not when they are united only inadequately to one unlimited third thing, and communicable to things really distinct. Now, a personal relation is so identified with the essence that it nevertheless does not equal it, because it is not identified with other relations, with which the essence itself is identified, nor is the essence itself so identified with one personal relation that it is not also identified with others, and remains communicable to them because of its infinite fecundity and unlimitedness, and these relations, as has been said, however much identified with the essence, preserve their formal notion, which is to be opposed to each other, and therefore to be really distinguished. This amounts to almost the same as the first explanation. And this can be illustrated by some analogous similarity, for a perfect parity of this thing cannot be had in created things, which because of their limitation cannot be identified with many things really distinct. Just as, therefore, it is true in natural things that things which are united to one third thing are united to each other, so also it is true that things which are nearby or present to one third thing are present to each other, thus, e.g., two bodies cannot be present to one space without being present to each other. If, however, there is given some third thing which, while remaining the same, exists in several distant places, or in several really distinct parts, neither those places nor those parts will be present to each other, although they are present to the same third thing, because they are not present to it adequately. Thus the Body of Christ is present to several hosts, which nevertheless are not present to each other. The

foot and the head are present to the same Soul, which parts nevertheless are not present and near to each other.

From these you may gather the reason why these and similar demonstrative syllogisms are not valid. This God is the Father: This God is the Son. Therefore, the Son is the Father. This divine essence is Paternity: This divine essence is Filiation. Therefore, Filiation is Paternity. It is not that the form of the demonstrative syllogism fails in this mystery, but that in these and similar cases it is not preserved. For just as in a syllogism about a common term it is required that the middle be perfectly distributed, so it is of the nature of a demonstrative syllogism that the middle be perfectly singularized, which does not happen here. For these terms, This God, this Essence, although they are singular, are nevertheless equivalently universal, or have the force of a common term, because that God, this singular Essence is communicable to several supposits, which is proper to a common term; hence we should not use those terms as middles for demonstrative syllogisms, because they are not perfectly singularized, but use them as common terms, and then they must be perfectly distributed, not indeed by saying every God, but everything that is God is the Father, everything that is the Divine Essence is Paternity, but then these propositions are false, because something is God, namely the Son, which is not the Father, and something is the Divine Essence, namely Filiation, which is not Paternity.

To the 2nd. I respond that the Father does not produce his own being, but only communicates it, which he can do, because that being is of such eminence and fecundity that, while remaining the same, it can be possessed by many, and since it is altogether the same in the Father and the Son, it is not from the Father as from a cause with dependency,

but as from a principle of Origin. To the 3rd principle drawn from the definition of Person, I respond that it is understood by many thus, that Personality renders not nature in itself incommunicable, but the composite itself, and the Person, or nature reduplicatively as personified, which is also verified in this Mystery; for the Person of the Father, or the divine nature with the mode of Paternity, and as personified, is not communicated to another, for there is only one Father in the Divine. However, granting that in creatures it is understood differently, so that in them Personality renders nature itself in itself incommunicable to another supposit, because created nature, being finite, is filled by one personality; in the first sense, however, it must be verified in the divine, both because due to its infinity and infinite fecundity it is not equaled or filled by one Personality as created nature is, and also because Personality in the Divine is not something absolute as in creatures, but something relative, and it is of the nature of the relative that it have a correlative.

Objection 2. From the infinity of the divine nature it is concluded with St. Thomas that it is one and unmultiplicable, but a Person in the divine, as virtually distinct from the Essence, is also infinite. Therefore. I respond 1. I distinguish the minor. A Person in the divine, as virtually distinct from the Essence, is infinite by reason of the essence, which it includes. I concede. By reason of its relative concept precisely, I deny the minor. For since, as we shall say, under that respect it does not add perfection, it also does not add infinity, but abstracts from infinity and finitude. I respond 2. Given the minor, I deny the consequence. The disparity is that since a Person in the divine is constituted by a relation, as we shall see below, and this necessarily requires a term which it respects, it does not

import infinity simply, but in a certain genus, e.g., Paternity in the notion of Paternity, and therefore does not exclude any other Person, but only another Father. But if there were several infinite Essences, since they would not be opposed to each other relatively, nor consequently be distinguished by reason of that opposition, they would have to be distinguished by some formal and essential notion which one would have and not the other, which therefore would not be infinite.

Objection 3. A reason cannot be assigned why there are three Persons rather than two, or four, or more. Therefore. I deny the antecedent. And I assign the reason: because in God there must be one unproduced Person, and two produced ones, and no more. For the distinction of Persons in the divine is only according to the relation of Origin, from which it follows, first, that there can be only one unproduced Person, since between unproduced persons there is no relation of origin. Second, that since there are only two Processions in the Divine, one through the intellect, the other through the will (for procession in the divine is not considered according to transient action, but immanent, which is twofold: to understand and to will. But power is the principle of acting on another, hence according to power is taken action toward the outside, and the procession of Creatures, not of the divine Person), there are consequently also only two proceeding Persons, or terminating the twofold Procession. St. Thomas relates many other arguments of the Gentiles in Book 1 against the Gentiles, chapter 10.

Article III. Whether the Mystery of the most Holy Trinity can be known by natural light.

Dissertation I.

The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity cannot be known or demonstrated by any natural reasoning. This position stands against Abelard and certain others who maintained that the mysteries of our faith can be demonstrated by reason, whom St. Bernard refutes in chapter 19 of Ecclesiasticus and book 5, chapter 8 of De Consideratione.

This is proven first by authority. In Matthew 11 it is said: "No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son wishes to reveal him." Likewise in chapter 16, Christ says to Peter who professed his sonship: "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven." And Pope Hormisdas in Epistle 79 to Emperor Justin states: "The secret of the Trinity could not be investigated by any nature of visible or invisible beings."

It is proven secondly by reason. We can know nothing about God through natural reason except from created effects, for we know nothing about God a priori or through causation, since there is no cause of God or of the Trinity. But from created effects, at least natural ones, we cannot arrive at knowledge of such a Mystery. Therefore, the proposition is proven. The minor premise is proven as follows: an effect, no matter how perfectly known, does not lead to knowledge of its cause except under that aspect by which it proceeds from the cause and has an intrinsic connection with it. Thus, for example, an effect proceeding from an artisan, such as a house from a builder, manifests the art from which it inherently proceeds and shows the man as an artisan, but not other accidental qualities of this man that do not pertain to his art, e.g., that he was tall or short,

white or black, fat or thin, dressed in red or green, etc. But created effects do not proceed from or inherently depend on God as triune, but only as one. Therefore, the minor premise is proven: Created effects proceed from God by reason of divinity as the radical cause, and by reason of omnipotence as the proximate cause. But omnipotence belongs to God prior to the relations by which the persons are constituted, and pertains to the nature as it is one, not as it is three in persons, for each person does not have a proper and distinct omnipotence. Hence it is commonly said that the works of the Trinity externally are undivided. Therefore, created effects do not proceed inherently from God as triune, but only concomitantly, insofar as the productive power is one and the same in the three persons. Thus, if by impossibility God were not triune, creatures would nevertheless remain, because the power productive of them would remain.

From this you may infer: 1. That even supposing faith, this mystery cannot be evidently demonstrated by natural reason alone, because divine revelation does not make creatures inherently depend on and proceed from God as triune, nor does it place in creatures any vestige of the Trinity. If you say that natural reason dictates evidently that God is truthful in revelation, therefore, supposing the revelation of this Mystery, reason evidently dictates that it exists. I respond and make a distinction in the conclusion: Reason evidently dictates that it exists through an intrinsic natural medium connected with that Mystery—denied; through an extrinsic medium, namely, the authority of the revealer—granted. Nor do we deny that the created intellect, aided by faith and using it, can by its natural power know that the Mystery of the Trinity exists, but we deny that it, even supposing faith but not using it, can prove this Mystery

through some natural medium intrinsically connected with this Mystery, because faith does not furnish it with such a medium, since, as we have said, it does not make creatures inherently depend on the Trinity. Hence, although the created intellect is perfected by divine revelation, it can never evidently know the Trinity in created effects, because it is not knowably contained in them. 2. You may infer that, for the same reason, not even the possibility of this Mystery can be established by natural reason alone.

For the solution of objections, note: 1. That the Philosophers did not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity through its proper attributes, which are Paternity, Filiation, and Procession, according to 1 Corinthians 2: "We speak the wisdom of God... which none of the rulers of this age understood," that is, none of the philosophers; but they knew only certain essential attributes which are appropriated to the persons, such as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. Hence by the "Word" in Platonic books is not understood a person begotten by the Father consubstantial with him, but the ideal principle through which God established all things, which is appropriated to the Son. 2. That if certain pagan philosophers had some knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity, it was not from created effects by natural reason, but either from the teaching and tradition of the Hebrews, or from reading the Scriptures or Sibylline books, or from other causes adduced by St. Thomas (in 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4).

Nevertheless, supposing faith, this mystery can be supported by various congruences and defended against opposing arguments. For 1: the highest good is maximally self-diffusive, which diffusion appears especially in this mystery. 2: For supreme happiness, friendship and society

are required, which demand a number of equal persons. 3: To generate something similar to oneself is a perfection. 4: In ourselves we experience a procession of word and love, which, setting aside imperfections, seems necessary to admit in God. Hence it is commonly said that this mystery is above, but not contrary to reason, which is evident since the principles of nature known per se are true, the teachings of faith are most true, and truth is not contrary to truth but only to falsehood.

Objection: It can be proven by natural reason that this mystery is at least possible. Therefore. The antecedent is proven: It can be proven that it does not involve contradiction. But what is proven not to involve contradiction is proven to be possible. Therefore. I respond and distinguish the major premise: It can be proven not to involve contradiction positively and evidently—denied; negatively and probably—granted. With the minor premise distinguished in this sense, I deny the conclusion. When, therefore, we solve the arguments from reason and the contradictions that are raised concerning the possibility of this Mystery, we proceed only from probabilities and appearances, but by no demonstrative reason, whether a priori or a posteriori, do we prove their falsity. And this indeed suffices that this Mystery not be judged impossible, but not that it be known evidently as possible. Indeed, having solved all the arguments of the pagans, who would persuade himself that his solutions are invincibly demonstrative, and that no implication remains to be solved beyond those already solved? No one, certainly, because no one, whether angel or man, can thoroughly penetrate this sacrament, which transcends all nature.

Instance: From what has been said, this Mystery cannot be demonstrated to be impossible. Therefore, it can be proven to be possible, for between possible and impossible there is no middle ground. I respond and deny the conclusion. For although between possible and impossible there is no middle ground, there is nevertheless a middle ground between demonstration of possibility and demonstration of impossibility, namely, opinion, doubt, or ignorance about either, and this happens in Mysteries which, since they transcend all natural light, do not fall under demonstration.

You ask whether and what notion of this mystery was granted to the Jews? I respond: 1. To the Patriarchs, Prophets, and those excelling in singular holiness, a clear notion of this mystery was granted.

For to the aforementioned was granted the notion or explicit faith of the Incarnation of the Word; but this presupposes a clear notion of the Trinity, since Christ is the second person of the Trinity incarnate. Therefore. The major premise is proven from the desires of the Saints of the Old Testament. In Matthew 13, Christ says: "Truly I say to you that many prophets and righteous men desired to see what you see and did not see it." 2. The Patriarchs and Prophets themselves committed this mystery to writing, as we saw above. Thus the Holy Fathers Ambrose, Augustine, Epiphanius, Cyril of Alexandria, and others believe.

I respond: 3. It is probable that to certain experts in the law and scribes of the Jewish nation this notion of the mystery was granted, but not, according to the Holy Fathers, to the common people of the Jewish nation, because 1, as Theodoret says in Discourse 1 on Greek Affections, lest they take from it occasion for polytheism; 2, because a more

perfect knowledge of divinity was to be reserved for Christ and the new law as more noble.

You ask: 2. Whether the word "homoousios" or "consubstantial" was appropriately inserted into the Nicene Creed? I respond in the affirmative. Proof: This word signifies that the Son is not only similar to the Father but is of exactly the same nature and essence, which is the Catholic Faith, and therefore it was eminently suitable for defeating the Arian heresy, which reduced the Son to the order of creatures. Therefore, it was fittingly applied. This is confirmed: The Arians were abusing other terms, and therefore their subterfuges had to be countered by another word that would more clearly express the faith of the Church, such as "homoousios." For when the Nicene Fathers said the Son was "from God," the Arians assented, but understood it to mean that he was from God just as all other creatures are from God, who made all things. When the Fathers said the Son was "similar" to the Father, the Arians also admitted this, understanding him to be similar to the Father as humans, who are said to be made in the image and likeness of God. Likewise, when the Fathers said the Son was "in God," was "unchangeable," was "always," was "true God," the Arians conceded that all these things could be said of the Son because all these things are likewise said of humans in Scripture: To be "in God"—"in him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17); to be "unchangeable"—"who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" (Romans 8); to be "always"—"we who live are always..." (2 Corinthians 4); to be "true God," because he became true God in time by the principality of virtue. Therefore, says Athanasius in his Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, the bishops, considering their hypocrisy and craftiness, were themselves

compelled by necessity... to repeat in clearer words what they had said before, and to write that the Son is "consubstantial" with the Father.

For solving objections, note: 1. That this word, although not found in the Scriptures as to its sound, is found at least as to its sense, for it is said: "I and the Father are one," "The Father is in me and I in the Father," which is the same, says St. Athanasius, as saying, "I am from the Father and inseparable from him." 2. Theognostus and both Dionysiuses, of Rome and of Alexandria, who wrote before the Council of Nicaea around the year 266, said that the Son was produced from the substance of the Father and was consubstantial with the Father, according to St. Athanasius in his book on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod. Indeed, Dionysius of Alexandria, in his Epistle to Paul of Samosata, testifies that even the more ancient Fathers called the Son consubstantial with the Father, "whom," he says, "the Holy Fathers called homoousios with the Father." And if in all the Fathers this word is not found as to its sound, it is evidently found as to its sense. 3. Moreover, if at some time by some, and perhaps by some Synod, this word "homoousios" was rejected, this rejection should not be taken as condemning the sense of the Catholic Church and the Nicene Synod, or as suggesting that the word is not suitable for expressing this sense, but what was condemned was the sense of the heretics, or the word was rejected in the sense in which the heretics were using it. For Paul of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch, around the middle of the 3rd century, according to St. Athanasius in his book on the Synods of Rimini and Seleucia, understood this word in the manner of corporeal substances, which when said to be consubstantial are understood to be of the same substance as to species only,

not as to number or individual, and in this sense the Synod of Antioch denied that the Son was consubstantial—if it is true that this Synod condemned the word, which recent scholars not improbably deny.

DISSERTATION II.

ON THE PROCESSIONS OF THE DIVINE PERSONS.
(ST. THOMAS, Q. 27)

Since, as is evident from what has been said in the preceding Dissertation, the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity consists in three persons of the same and individual divine nature, and since the Persons are constituted by relations, and relations are founded on processions, therefore with the Author we will speak: 1. of Processions, 2. Of Relations, 3. Of Persons.

Article I. Whether there are processions in the Divine.

Procession as such is nothing other than the origin of one from another; hence procession in the Divine is the origin of one Person from another, or from two. But since every procession is according to some action, just as according to an action that tends toward external matter there is a procession outward, so according to an action that remains in the agent itself, a certain inward procession is considered. Arius, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as his first creature, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son as a creature of both; Sabellius, saying that God the Father himself is called the Son insofar as he

assumed flesh from the Virgin, and is called the Holy Spirit insofar as he sanctifies the rational creature—both understood procession as something outward. But here we ask whether there is procession in God inwardly.

I say: There are processions in God inwardly. This is established by all those arguments by which we proved above the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, which they have communicated to them only by way of procession. It is proven by theological reasoning: It is of faith that there are several Persons in God really distinct in the same numerical nature; therefore there are processions in God. The consequence is proven: If there were no processions in God, there would be no relative opposition of origin; without relative opposition of origin, several Persons could not be distinguished except by diversity of nature; therefore. Hence Christ, speaking of himself in John 8, says, "I proceeded from God," and in John 5 of the Holy Spirit, "who proceeds from the Father," and thus the Church sings in the Nicene Creed of the Son: "Born of the Father, God from God"; and of the Holy Spirit: "Who proceeds from the Father and the Son." St. Thomas offers this fitting reason: Whoever understands, by the very fact that he understands, produces something within himself, which is the conception of the thing understood proceeding from the intellectual power and from his knowledge, which conception the voice signifies and is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice. But God is the most perfect understander. Therefore.

Objection: Every procession involves imperfection. Therefore. The antecedent is proven: 1. What proceeds is different from that from which it proceeds; 2. It depends on that without which it cannot exist; 3. It is posterior to it; 4. It is of a passive and needy nature, since it receives from

another. Therefore. I respond to the first with St. Thomas and distinguish: What proceeds by an outward procession is different from that from which it proceeds—granted; by an inward procession—I subdivide: in created beings—granted; in the Divine—I further subdivide: it is different as to Person—granted; as to nature—denied; because what proceeds inwardly by an intellectual process, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one with that from which it proceeds, for the more perfectly something is understood, the more the word or intellectual conception is intimate and more one. Hence, since divine understanding is of infinite perfection, the divine Word must be perfectly one with him from whom it proceeds, without any diversity in nature. And although the same reasoning does not apply to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the will by way of love and impulse, nevertheless, by the very fact that he proceeds as something immanent to God, he is the same in nature, because everything that is in God is God. If you say that from this response of St. Thomas it follows that the Word does not proceed as a distinct Person, I respond and distinguish: it does not proceed as a distinct Person by virtue of procession as intelligible—granted; by virtue of procession as real—denied. Since, therefore, procession as intelligible is assimilative, it demands numerical unity with the object; hence if it is a most perfect intellect, it demands the most perfect unity, which is in substance. Yet this does not destroy the diversity of Persons, which is only relative and from procession insofar as it is real, because procession as real demands really distinct extremes, at least as to mode of being. Hence from procession itself under different considerations arises both the consubstantiality of the Word and the distinction of Persons.

To the second, I deny that what proceeds in the Divine depends on the producer. It does not depend as to nature, which is the same in number of the proceeding and the producing. Nor as to Person, because what proceeds does not proceed from another as from a cause, but as from a principle; nor from free will, but from necessity of nature due to its infinite perfection, whereby the Father, in understanding, cannot but produce the Word, and the Father and Son, in loving each other, cannot but produce the Holy Spirit. To the proof, I deny the consequence, because for dependence something else is required than that one cannot exist without the other, for the Father can no more exist without the Son than the Son without the Father, yet the Father is not said to depend on the Son. Likewise, omnipotence cannot exist without the possibility of creatures, yet it does not depend on them. To the third, some theologians admit no priority or posteriority in God, but only an order of procession. Others admit priority not of causality or duration, but of origin only, which does not imply imperfection. To the fourth, I deny the antecedent. For the proceeding Persons in the divine never lacked, nor could lack, what they have. But what never lacked, nor could lack, what it has, is not considered of a passive and needy nature.

Article II. How many processions are there in God?

I say: in God there are two processions, and not more: one through the intellect by which the Word is begotten, the other through the will by which love is spirated. Both parts are proven by the authority of Scripture, which, besides the procession of the Word, which it acknowledges in many

places, as in John chapters 1 and 8 and elsewhere, admits another procession of the Holy Spirit as distinct from the Word. John 14: "I will ask the Father and he will give you another Paraclete." And 15: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father." Beyond these, Holy Scripture acknowledges no other procession. So also the Fathers and Councils. Therefore.

It is proven secondly: In the divine, procession is considered according to immanent action, not transient action. But in God, as an intellectual agent, there are two immanent actions and not more, namely intellection and volition, virtually distinct. Therefore also two processions, one through the intellect which is the procession of the Word, the other through the will, which is the procession of love: for just as through intellection or conception of the Word, says the Holy Doctor here, the thing understood is in the one understanding, so through love the thing loved is in the lover, not in the sense that in the lover is produced the thing loved or its likeness, as in the one understanding, but a certain impulse and inclination of the will toward the thing loved. Hence the thing loved is said to be in the lover, not as its object or likeness, but as the intrinsic term of love and volition. It should be noted, however, that the Son receives the intellect exhausted by his very production, but receives the will not yet exhausted. For although both processions and persons are simultaneous in time, there is nevertheless an order of origin between them, so that in our way of understanding, the generation of the Word is conceived prior to the spiration of the Holy Spirit, because intellection is prior to volition, and nothing is willed unless previously known, as the common axiom states. In that instant,

therefore, when the Son is conceived to be generated through the intellect, that intellect is conceived as exhausted by the production of the Son himself, since it is an infinite term adequate to infinite intellection. And since it is the same intellect of the producing Father that the Son receives and by which he understands, there is no place for this already exhausted intellect to produce another Word. But he receives in the same generation the will not yet exhausted by the spiration of the Holy Spirit, who in that instant of the generation of the Word is not yet conceived as spirated; consequently, with that not exhausted will, the Son can produce the Holy Spirit with the Father.

Objection: Every infinite is unique and not multiplied. But divine procession is infinite. Therefore. 2. I distinguish the major: Every infinite is unique in its own order, or in that aspect in which it is infinite—granted; it is unique excluding infinites of another kind—denied; and with the minor thus distinguished, I deny the consequence. Thus mercy is infinite by reason of mercy, or, so to speak, intensively, yet not extensively, or in the sense that it is the only infinite attribute in God. Similarly with processions.

Objection 2: Good is self-diffusive. Therefore according to divine goodness a procession should be admitted. I respond and distinguish the antecedent: Good is self-diffusive objectively—granted; effectively—denied. Good is called self-diffusive in this sense, that it is an object and end desirable by the will, not that it is a principle of operation or self-diffusion. Hence since divine processions are considered according to actions, according to goodness and other such attributes, no processions are admitted other than those of the Word and love, insofar as God understands and loves his essence, truth, and goodness.

Article III. Whence does the procession of the Word have it that it is generation, and not the procession of the Holy Spirit?

Note: Generation, as it applies even to non-living things, is a change from non-being to being in some subject. But as it applies only to living things, it is commonly defined as: The origin of a living being from a conjoined living being in the likeness of a specific nature. It is said "in the likeness of nature," because what is begotten must not only be similar to the begetter in itself and essentially, but must also proceed similar to the begetter by virtue and mode of procession; that is, the mode of procession, considered according to its species and not only according to the individual, must be a mode of assimilation, or involve a reason why what proceeds is similar to its principle. Because the entire formality of generation consists in the expression of likeness, or in the propagation of nature as similar, nor is to generate anything else than to express a propagative likeness of oneself, according to Genesis 5: "Adam begot in his image and likeness." Due to the lack of this condition, Eve, formed from Adam's rib, is not begotten, nor his daughter, because, although she is essentially human like Adam, and by virtue of this procession considered individually proceeded similar to him, nevertheless not by virtue of procession considered according to species, because the mode of proceeding from a rib is not assimilative, or does not involve a reason why what is thus made is similar in nature to him from whose rib it is made; for from that rib a horse or anything else could have been made, not so from the generative action instituted by nature.

I say firstly: The procession of the Word is generation, not the procession of the Holy Spirit. The first part is clearly attested by the Scriptures. Psalm 2: "You are my Son, today I have begotten you." Psalm 109: "From the womb before the daystar I begot you." Isaiah 53: "Who shall declare his generation?" John 3: "The Father loves the Son." Matthew 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Where there is Father and Son, there is generation. Reason supports this: The procession of the word is the origin of a living being from a conjoined living being in the likeness of nature. Therefore. The antecedent is proven: 1. It is the origin of a living being from a living being, because it proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is an operation of life. Hence John 5: "As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son to have life in himself." 2. From a conjoined living being, because it is through an immanent action. Hence John 10: "I and the Father are one." 3. In the likeness of nature, because the conception of the intellect is a likeness of the thing understood, and existing in the same nature, because in God to understand and to be are the same.

The second part is likewise attested by Scripture, according to which the Holy Spirit is never named Son or begotten; and the Word is called the Only-begotten of the Father in John 1 and 3, 1 John 4, and elsewhere. If Only-begotten, then neither the Spirit nor anyone else besides him is begotten. It is irrelevant that Solomon in Proverbs 8 is called only-begotten, although he had brothers from the same father and from the same mother (1 Chronicles 3). For Solomon is not called only-begotten absolutely, but only-begotten before his mother, which signifies that he was uniquely loved by his mother as if he were an only child;

hence the Septuagint translated it as "beloved in the sight of his mother." Finally, the Council of Ephesus, chapter 4, says: "The Son of God is called firstborn and only-begotten: firstborn in comparison with adopted sons, and only-begotten through the exclusion of a natural son." Both parts are unanimously taught by the Holy Fathers, as seen in the preceding Dissertation, and the whole Church professes in all the Symbols of faith, in which the second person is said to be born, the third only proceeding, but especially in the Symbol attributed to St. Athanasius: "The Son is from the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."

Here faith stops, but not theologians, who labor to investigate the causes of this difference and offer various opinions, which they nevertheless propose modestly, not as decisive, as if our faith rested on these, but supposing faith, as probable. The first opinion says that the Word is begotten because he proceeds from only one. But this reason seems insufficient, for whether something proceeds from one or from two, as among humans, by the very fact that it proceeds in the likeness of nature, it is a Son. The second opinion says that the Son is begotten, and not the Holy Spirit, because although both by virtue of procession proceed as similar in nature, yet the Son proceeds as an image. Thus Vasquez. But against this: By the very fact that something proceeds by virtue of procession as similar, it proceeds as an image, whence it would follow in this opinion that the Holy Spirit is begotten. The third opinion says that the procession of the Word is generation because the Word receives a fecund nature, capable of producing another supposit. Thus Richard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, and others. But neither

does this reason seem sufficient; for although the Son were not productive of the Holy Spirit, he would still be Son, for nature would still be communicated to him under the concept of nature, of whose concept it is not that it be a principle in relation to another. The fourth opinion says that the procession of the Word, not the procession of the Holy Spirit, is generation because the first proceeds naturally, or by way of nature, because the intellect is naturally determined to act, not the second because the will is a voluntary agent and free with essential liberty even with respect to the Procession of the Holy Spirit. Thus Francis Henno, disputation 1 on the Triune God, question 5. But against this: If by essential liberty is understood liberty of indifference, the proposition would be heretical, for it is Catholic dogma that God so necessarily loves himself, by necessity of nature, that he can no more refrain from love of himself than from knowledge of himself. If, however, immunity from coercion is understood, the Procession of the Word enjoys this liberty no less than the Procession of the Holy Spirit. For the Father not coercedly, not unwillingly, but voluntarily and spontaneously produces the Word. These opinions being set aside, therefore, with St. Thomas, the Thomists, and many others, I say: The reason why the procession of the Word is generation, and not the procession of the Holy Spirit, is because the procession of the Word is through the intellect, which by its own power is assimilative, and the procession of the Holy Spirit is through the will, which by its own power is not assimilative. Scripture favors this opinion which, while calling the Word Son, and not calling him who is not the Word Son, indicates that he is Son because he is Word, and the Spirit is not Son because he is not Word. Accordingly, St. Augustine in book 6 of On the

Trinity, chapter 2, says: "He is Son insofar as he is Word, and he is Word insofar as he is Son." Likewise Athanasius in Orations 2 and 3 against the Arians, Ambrose in the book on the Incarnation, chapter 3, and others. It is proven by reason: It is of the nature of generation that by its own power and per se, or considered according to species, it proceed in the likeness of nature. But this belongs to procession which is through the intellect, and not to procession which is through the will. Therefore. The major premise is evident from what was said at the beginning of the article. The minor premise is proven: This is the difference between intellect and will, that the intellect understands by the fact that the thing understood is in the intellect according to likeness, hence by its own power and per se, considered according to species, it is assimilative; but the will wills not by the fact that some likeness of the willed is in the will, but by the fact that the will has a certain inclination toward the willed thing. Therefore procession, which is considered according to intellect, is by its own power and per se according to the nature of likeness; but procession, which is considered according to will, is not by its own power and per se according to the nature of likeness, but rather according to the nature of impelling and moving toward something.

Objection: It is not of the nature of intellect as such, as it abstracts from divine and human, to assimilate its term in nature, but only to assimilate intentionally or intelligibly. Therefore the divine Word does not have that it is the consubstantial Son of the Father precisely from the fact that it proceeds through the intellect. I respond and deny the antecedent for the second part. For it is false that it is of the nature of intellect as such generally to assimilate only intelligibly; this belongs to an imperfect and created intellect.

Intellect as such, and generally, is assimilative as such, or tends toward some likeness as such. Just as likeness as such is divided into perfect or substantial likeness and imperfect or merely intelligible likeness, so also intellect as such is divided into perfect or divine intellect and imperfect or created intellect; and just as imperfect intellect by its own power, as a species of intellect as such, tends toward imperfect and merely intelligible likeness, so perfect intellect by its own power, as an analogous species of intellect as such, tends toward perfect and substantial likeness.

Objection 2: The Spirit by virtue of procession formally proceeds as similar in divine nature. Therefore his procession is generation, or the procession of the Word is not generation. The antecedent is proven: The Holy Spirit by virtue of his procession is God. Therefore. The antecedent is proven: By virtue of his procession he is a subsisting and divine Person. Therefore. I respond and deny the antecedent. To the proof I distinguish the antecedent: The Spirit by virtue of his procession considered individually is God—granted; by virtue of his procession considered according to species—denied. The procession of the Holy Spirit can thus be considered in two ways: 1. According to species, insofar as it is procession by way of will; 2. According to the individual, insofar as it is this procession, namely, of love immanent to God. If this procession is considered individually, the Holy Spirit, by virtue of it, proceeds as God, because since this action considered individually is divine and immanent, so also its term is divine, consequently God. But if procession is considered according to species, as it is from the will, which procession is proper to the Holy Spirit, by virtue of it so considered, he does not proceed formally as God, because he does not proceed formally as similar, since it is not of the

nature of will to assimilate, but he has this from elsewhere, namely, because he proceeds as something divine and immanent to God. Further, for a procession to be generation, it is not sufficient that it be assimilative identically, or considered according to the individual, but that it be assimilative considered according to formal and specific reason, or as others say, in the fourth mode per se. And hence some thus distinguish the same antecedent: The Holy Spirit formally by virtue of his procession proceeds as spirated God—granted; as begotten God—denied.

You ask, why, since the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father, is the term "procession" adapted to the emanation of the Holy Spirit rather than to the Son? I respond that this is due to the poverty of vocabulary. For since we cannot name God except from creatures, and in creatures we find something subsisting proceeding by way of nature, which we call being generated, hence the procession of the Son, which is by way of nature, is called generation. But because in created things we see nothing subsisting proceeding by way of love, it happens that the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is through love, has remained thus and is called by the name of procession; it could, however, be named spiration, because it is the procession of the Spirit.

Consectaria (Corollaries)

From what has been said, it follows that the principle of divine processions is the persons of the Father and the Son: the Father with respect to the Son, and the Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit, because that which proceeds really must be really distinguished from its producer, as nothing produces itself, and there is no real

distinction in the divine except between persons. 2. The principle by which (quo), at least remote and primordial, is the divine nature: because it is that in which the begotten is similar to and shares with the begetter; however, understand this of nature as modified by relations, as I will explain shortly. And on these two points all theologians agree. 3. The proximate principle by which (quo) of divine processions, according to the common opinion of theologians with St. Thomas against Durandus and a few others, is intellect and will; but because both intellect and will are common to the three Persons, a reason must be assigned why the intellect in the Father generates and not in the Son, why the will in the Father and Son spirates, and not in the Holy Spirit. Hence theologians say that the intellect generates in the Father because it is modified by the relation of paternity, not in the Son; the will spirates in the Father and Son because it is modified by the relation of active spiration, not in the Holy Spirit (here, and q. a. de Potentia a. ad 5), so that the proximate principle by which (quo) of divine processions includes not only something absolute, namely intellect and will, but also relations, not as co-principles, but as conditions and modes only. For 1. The Lateran Council under Innocent III, defining against Abbot Joachim, says: "And that reality (namely the divine nature) is not generating, nor proceeding, but it is the Father who generates, and the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds." 2. Essence does not operate immediately by itself, but through its faculties, which in God are intellect and will. 3. The principle that (quod) of procession must at least according to something be really distinguished from what proceeds, for nothing produces itself; but intellect and will in God precisely in themselves, setting aside relations, are in no way really

distinguished from what proceeds. Thus in some way at least (for no adequate parallel can be found in created things) the same intellect of the Father and Son, modified in the Father by the relation of paternity, generates, but not in the Son; the same will of the three persons, modified in the Father and Son by the relation of active spiration, produces the Holy Spirit, but not in the Holy Spirit.

Objection: The divine nature in itself, and as pre-understood to intellect and will, is fecund. Therefore. Response: I distinguish the antecedent. It is fecund radically and remotely, I concede; proximately, I deny, for nature, as has been said, does not act except through its faculties.

Objection from another perspective: The Father is the principle of generation by that by which he is able to generate. But he is able to generate by Paternity. Therefore. The minor is proved: the Father is able to generate by that which is proper and singular to him, and not common to the three Persons. But only the relation of paternity is proper and singular to him. Therefore. Response: I distinguish the major: By that as by a required condition the Father is able to generate, which is proper to him, I concede; as by a true principle, I deny. For what gives individual being gives the ability to operate as that which (quod), not as that by which (quo); for the individual nature of Peter, for example, does not give him the ability to operate as that by which (quo), but human nature does. Therefore three things concur for someone to be a Father, or a complete principle of generation: 1. A fecund nature, and this is the principal and radical principle by which (quo). 2. The faculty through which, as through an instrument, the fecundity of nature expresses itself, which in God is the intellect, and we have said this is the proximate principle by which (quo). 3.

Finally, the hypostasis, by which the Person is constituted, and generates as that which (quod), and in God this is Paternity. The hypostasis, however, is not the principle by which (quo), but the complement and required condition, so that the principle may act, because actions are of supposita. In summary, therefore, it must be said that both the absolute and the relative are included in the principle by which (quo) of the divine Processions, but not equally. The absolute is included directly, and as form; the relative obliquely, as mode and condition.

Article IV. In what the Divine processions actively taken formally consist.

I say 1. Divine processions actively taken are not simple emanations, but true and proper actions. Proof 1. If the immediate principles of divine processions are active, namely intellect and will, then they are acts of intellect and will. And it should be noted that the nature of action properly speaking is only that it is the ultimate actuality of the agent proceeding from it by formal or virtual procession; but virtual procession does not imply imperfection any more than the virtual emanation of properties in God. Nor should it be said that God is truly and properly an agent but only truly and properly understanding, because this name "agent" is commonly taken for a principle producing through true causality with dependence, just as although the Father is the principle of the Word, the Word should not be called "principiated," because, as St. Thomas notes, the name "principiated" implies diminution and inferiority, which do not belong to the Word.

I say 2. Diction and spiration, which are notional acts in which divine processions formally consist, are not distinguished from intellection and volition virtually, or, according to the way of speaking of Scotists, formally ex natura rei, as acts from acts, but they are the very intellection and volition, differing only by the connotation of relation. Proof from the Fathers: According to the Holy Fathers, the Word proceeds through thought. But to think formally is to understand. Therefore. Proof: Irenaeus 2. c. 48 says, "God being entirely mind and entirely logos, what he thinks, this he speaks, and what he speaks, this he thinks." Tertullian against Praxeas c. 5 calls the Son the reason of God, because the Father produces him by thinking. St. Fulgentius 1. 3. to Monimus c. 7 says, "Thus is the Word with God, as is the word in the mind... For when the mind has a word within itself, it certainly has it by thinking: because to speak within oneself is nothing else than to think within oneself. When therefore the mind thinks, and by thinking generates a word within itself." What could be more explicit? Also Augustine 15. on the Trinity c. 13 says, "The Word is born of the Father's knowledge, of the Father's wisdom"; but to be knowing and wise is to understand, says Fr. Henno the Scotist himself. Hence the same Holy Doctor says in book 7 c. 2 that the word is begotten wisdom.

Proof 2. By reason: Diction and intellection in us are not two really distinct acts, but two formalities, or two inadequate functions of the same act, which, insofar as it is directed to the object to be known, is called intellection, and insofar as by knowing the object it forms a word, is called diction. Therefore in God they are not virtually distinct, or according to the Scotists formally distinct ex natura rei, as two acts. This is confirmed: every act of the intellect is

intellection, and every act of the will is volition; but diction is an act of the intellect, and spiration is an act of the will; therefore, diction is intellection, and spiration is volition. The Scotists admit the minor. Proof of the major: 1. Every act of the visual power is vision; therefore every act of the intellect is intellection, and every act of the will is volition. 2. The formal and adequate object of the intellect is intelligible truth. But every act attaining an object under the aspect of intelligible truth is intellection. Therefore every act of the intellect is intellection; and for the same reason, every act of the will is volition. Thus intellection and volition in God can be considered in two ways: 1. Precisely in themselves and in isolation, and thus they are essential acts common to the three persons. 2. As modified by the relations of Paternity and active Spiration, and thus they are notional acts and active processions, and from this intellection has it that it is diction, and volition that it is spiration, in the way we said above about the proximate principle by which (quo).

What we say here about Processions actively taken should be said with proper proportion about processions passively taken, so that just as understanding modified by the relation of Paternity is active generation, so being understood modified by the relation of Son, or filiation, is nativity and passive origin, hence relation enters into both not as form, but as complement of form, as has been said.

Objection with the Scotists: A productive action must be distinguished from one that is not productive. But diction is productive, not intellection, which in itself only expresses a tendency toward the object to be known, not toward the Word to be produced. Therefore. Response: I distinguish the major: A productive action must be distinguished from one that is not productive in some respect, I concede; simply and

equally as act from act, I deny. We do not deny, therefore, that there is some distinction between intellection and diction. Intellection precisely imports only a relation to the thing understood; diction principally imports a relation to the Word conceived, but nevertheless diction itself is intellection, because the Word is conceived by understanding. Thus, says the Holy Doctor, the intellect of Man speaks by the word which it conceives by understanding the stone, so that understanding and speaking are two formalities, or two inadequate functions of the same action adequately taken. But intellection has it that it is diction from the connotation of relation, as has been said.

DISSERTATION III.

ON THE DIVINE RELATIONS. (ST. THOMAS, Q. 28)

Article I. Whether there are real relations in God and how many there are.

I say: In God there are some real relations. Here and q. 8. de pot. a. 1. It is proved, 1. It is certain by faith that there are three really distinct Persons in God, and that they are not really distinguished in absolute attributes, in which they are consubstantial: therefore they are distinguished in relative attributes, or relations. I subsume: but not in relations of reason, for these cannot make a real distinction: therefore in real relations: therefore there are real relations in God. We have proved the major premise in the first Dissertation. The subsumption is self-evident. Hence St. Thomas in the citation says the conclusion is of faith. This is confirmed: The Father is so called only from Paternity, and the Son from Filiation; if Paternity and Filiation are not really in God, it follows that God is not really Father or Son, but only according to concepts of the intellect, which is the Sabellian heresy.

From what has been said, you may infer that relations in God are real not only according to the concept of "in" but also according to the concept of "to," because according to that concept of "to" they cause a real distinction of Persons,

insofar as only the relation to causes relative opposition, and all distinction in the divine is founded only on relative opposition. Note, however, that although relation in the divine is real according to the concept of "to," it does not have its reality from that concept or from that aspect which is "toward something," but from that aspect by which it exists in something. Because relation according to the nature of its genus, insofar as it is relation, does not have that it is something, but only that it is toward something. That it is something according to reality, it has from that aspect by which it exists in something, either as really identical, as in the Divine, or as an accident in a subject, as in created things. Hence although real relation from its mode of signification does not explicitly express "in," it nevertheless implies it, since it is that by which a subject is related to a term, and although it is not signified as inhering, it nevertheless need not be inhering.

Objection: Real relation implies many imperfections. Therefore it is not in God. The antecedent is proved: 1. It is of the weakest entity. 2. It makes a composition with what is related. 3. It makes it dependent on the correlative. 4. It orders it to something, which also is repugnant to God. Therefore. Response: I deny the antecedent. To the first and second proofs, I respond that they are verified of real relations in Creatures, which are accidents, not of divine relations, which are identified with the divine substance. To the 3rd, I similarly respond that it is true of created relations, which have a different being from the being of the substance to which they are added, and from the being of the term to which they refer, because they are accidents, but not of Divine Relations, which have the same being as the divine substance. If you say that at least one Person depends on

another, because correlatives depend on each other mutually, I respond that this should not be understood as dependence properly taken as subordination, but improperly as mutual connection or requirement. To the 4th, I respond that it is repugnant to God to be ordered to something outside Himself, not to something within Himself, nor should it be understood as if the divine nature is related, but the Person, for only that is related which is relatively opposed. And it should be noted that when two things are of the same order, and there is a relation between them according to something really common to both, then there is a real relation on the part of both, as is evident in the generation of humans. But when the extremes are not of the same order, nor is there a relation between them according to something common to both, then there is not a real relation on the part of both, but there can be a real relation on the part of one and only a relation of reason on the part of the other, as is evident in sense and the sensible object. Since, therefore, God is outside the whole order of Creatures, and all creatures are naturally ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are related to Him but He is not to them, although He has produced them. But the Father, by producing the Son consubstantial with Himself, communicates to Him His essence, hence they are of the same order and nature, and there is a relation between them according to something common to both; thus there is a real relation on the part of both.

I say 2. There are in God four real relations of origin, namely Paternity, Filiation, active Spiration and passive Spiration, or Procession, here, and in 1. dist. 27.q.1.a.1.c, but in such a way that active Spiration is not really distinguished from Paternity and Filiation, but only virtually. The first part

is proved. Real relations of origin are taken in God according to processions ad intra, in which they are founded, consequently there are as many real relations in God as the processions ad intra require; but there are two processions ad intra, one through intellect, which is the procession of the Word, the other through will, which is the procession of love, and each requires two relations, namely of the principle to what is principiated, and conversely of what is principiated to the principle: therefore there are four real relations, namely Paternity and Filiation, founded on procession through intellect, and active Spiration and passive Spiration, founded on procession through will. The second part is proved. According to a commonly received principle, all things in God are really one and the same where relative opposition does not intervene: but common active Spiration, which is in the Father and the Son, is not opposed to Paternity and Filiation, but is disparate to them: therefore it is not really distinguished from them. For understanding this, it should be observed that relations in created things are really distinguished from a twofold source. 1. From opposition to their correlative. 2. From their limitation, inasmuch as since it is a created relation, from this very fact it is limited to its species, and cannot have the species and perfection of other relations; hence one and the same relation cannot, by its entity, be related to several terms, even if they are only disparate, due to the limitation of created relative reality. But in the divine this reason of limitation does not apply because of the amplitude of infinity, but only the reason of correlative opposition; and therefore since the relations of Paternity and Filiation are not relatively opposed to active spiration, they are not really distinguished from it, but one and the same entity, because

of its infinity, can be related to different terms. Hence you may infer 1. Although there are four real relations in God, there are not four relative things, nor a quaternity, as is defined in ch. Damnamus de summa Trinitate. 2. There are not four persons, because persons are constituted by opposed relations and not by disparate ones; hence active spiration does not constitute a person other than the person of the Father and the person of the Son.

I say 3. Besides the four Relations of Origin assigned, there are no other real relations in God. This is the more common view with St. Thomas and the Thomists against Scotus and the Scotists, who admit real relations of equality and similarity in God. It is proved. In divine Persons there is nothing to consider except the essence, in which they communicate, and the relations, in which they are distinguished: But a real relation of equality and similarity cannot be taken from the essence, which is numerically the same, nor from the relations, because relation is not related by some other relation, otherwise there would be an infinite regress, and moreover one relation cannot be founded on another, since the foundation must be firmer than what is founded, and all relations are of equally weak entity. Therefore, although faith teaches that there is equality and similarity between divine Persons, nevertheless this equality and similarity in God are not real relations.

For the solution of the objection, note that for divine Persons to be and to be called truly and really equal, equality formally taken as a real relation is not required, but equality fundamentally taken, or the foundation of the relation, which is the unity of magnitude with the negation of excess, is sufficient; thus God is truly and really Lord, although the relation of lordship is not real in Him, but only its

foundation. Thus Christ is and is truly and really called the Son of the Blessed Virgin, because although the relation of filiation is not real in Him, nevertheless the foundation of this relation, namely passive generation, belongs to Him independently of the intellect. If you infer, therefore divine Persons are only fundamentally equal. Let it be so. They are nevertheless truly and really equal no less than God is really Lord, and Christ is the Son of the B.V., because truly in them is the unity of magnitude with the negation of excess, which provides our intellect with a foundation for conceiving them to be related, as if they were really related. Those who want more on this present difficulty should read Gonet disp. 13. a. 1. §. 2. And hence you may gather that among the relations of origin themselves there are no other virtually distinct relations of similarity, dissimilarity, distinction, and opposition, but they themselves are by themselves similar or dissimilar, distinct or opposed, just as in human relations Paternity is similar to another Paternity, and dissimilar to Filiation by itself, not by another superadded relation.

You ask how Divine Relations are identified with and distinguished from the Essence? In the preceding Treatise we supposed as certain from Faith that relations are not really distinguished from the essence: We further established and proved that they are distinguished by a minor virtual distinction, which is made by way of the implicit and explicit. Many recent authors ask further whether relations are so really identified with the essence that they are part of the quidditative concept of the essence, and conversely. Hence I respond: Relations in God are so identified with the Divine Essence that they are part of its quidditative concept, not explicit but implicit and inadequate; and conversely the essence is part of the concept of relations, also implicit, but

adequate. When we say that relations are part of the concept of the divine essence, we do not mean that they are its constitutive, as genus or difference, but that they are modes essentially and necessarily belonging to it, or by which it essentially demands to be modified; so that neither can the essence be without relations, nor be understood without them as it is in reality, nor can relations be or be understood, as they truly are, without the divine essence. The first Part is proved: If the divine essence were not part of the implicit concept of relations, and vice versa, so that they would not include each other, the Divine Essence would be conceived with foundation in reality as in potency to relations, actualizable and contractible by them, as by something extraneous, and lacking them. But this is repugnant to pure act: Therefore.

The 2nd Part is proved concerning the adequate and inadequate concept. Although whatever Paternity, or another relation imports, all that and totally is imported at least implicitly in the concept of essence, or Deity, nevertheless not all that the essence imports is also imported implicitly in Paternity, because Deity imports Filiation, which is not imported even implicitly in the concept of Paternity, except correlatively, since it is really opposed to it, and therefore really distinguished from it. Hence the concept of essence extends more broadly, and includes something other than the concept of any relation taken separately. Therefore.

You will say: If Paternity is of the essence of divinity, and vice versa, it follows that the Father, by generating the Son, communicates to Him Paternity, and thus the Son will be Father, or else communicates to Him only part of the substance, which the Lateran Council IV forbids us to say against Abbot Joachim. Therefore. I respond: This argument

militates against all Catholics who do not acknowledge a real distinction between essence and relations. For, supposing real identity, the same argument can be formed: If Paternity is really the essence of Divinity, it follows that the Father, by generating the Son, communicates to Him Paternity, or else communicates to Him part of the essence, and retains part for Himself. Other difficulties likewise arise against this common opinion, which are usually brought against the present conclusion, e.g., how does the Father generate, and not the essence, with which He is really identified? how is each Person really God, if it does not include the other Persons, which Divinity really includes? And other similar ones. Just as these are explained in the common Catholic opinion by means of virtual distinction by way of the explicit and implicit, so in the present opinion. It must therefore be said that although Paternity and essence mutually imply each other implicitly, they do not do so explicitly; and therefore, because they are virtually distinguished according to explicit and implicit concepts, and in the eminence of Divinity are identified while preserving their natures of communicability and incommunicability, the essence can be communicated to the Son with respect to all absolute essentials which it explicates and which are communicable, without communicating the relative, which it implies because of its opposition to the term to which the essence is communicated. Nor does it follow from this that only part of the essence is communicated to the Son, for the essence is indivisible; but it follows only that although He gives the whole essence to the Son, He nevertheless does not give everything that is His essence, or that He does not communicate the essence under every formality which the essence itself has. The essence has the nature of paternity

insofar as it is in the Father, and therefore does not communicate paternity to the Son, because it is a relation really opposed to filiation, although compared to the essence it is the same as it. In a word, the Father communicates to the Son the essence with respect to all things in which relative opposition does not intervene, because one relative cannot be communicated to its correlative, to which it is opposed. But that relations mutually opposed to each other, namely paternity, filiation, and active spiration with respect to passive spiration, are really distinguished among themselves, is clear from their very opposition, and from what we have said so far, especially in the preliminary Dissertation on the distinction and plurality of persons, which are constituted by these relations.

But how, given their perfect identity with the essence, they can nevertheless be really distinguished among themselves, and how the principle can be verified: things which are the same as a third thing are the same as each other, we have already explained.

Article II. Whether Divine relations have relative existences really distinct from each other and from the existence of the essence.

I presuppose as commonly accepted against a few that the divine essence, as pre-understood before relations, exists through its own absolute existence, because as pre-understood before relations, it is the purest act. Therefore it is actually existing; it is uncreated being, therefore existing of itself; it is operating by understanding and willing, therefore existing. Finally, in the very notion of divinity, existence

itself is included, for it is being existing of itself, according to Exodus 3: "I am who am."

I say (S. Th. 3. p. q. 17. a. 2. ad 3. and q. 8. de Potent. a. 2. ad 11.) Divine relations or Persons do not have their own relative existences, but exist by the one absolute existence of the essence. Proof 1. Absolute attributes are not multiplied in the Divine, because they are not relatively opposed to each other, and all things are one in God where relative opposition does not intervene; hence although there are three Persons, there is not a threefold understanding, a threefold willing, and a threefold power. But the existence of relation, or Person, which they improperly call relative, is something absolute: Therefore. The minor is proved: 1. The existence of relation does not consist in relation to a term, but in relation to the subject in which it is, for the existence of relation in created things is nothing other than inherence, and in divine things it is existence per se. Therefore it is something absolute, and not relative. 2. Existence does not belong to relation according to the concept of "To," but according to the concept of "In," both because the concept of "To" abstracts from existence, as we shall say below, and because what confers existence must exercise some causality regarding it; but a pure term only terminates, and does not actively cause anything. Therefore: Proof 2. Divine relations or Persons exist through the absolute existence of the essence: Therefore relative existences are superfluous, indeed they imply a contradiction. The antecedent and the consequence must be proved. The antecedent is proved: Existence in God is essentially identified with essence, for God is a being existing per se; Essence is communicated to relations or Persons, consequently also its existence: But existence cannot be communicated to something unless it

renders it existing, just as wisdom or whiteness cannot be communicated to a man without making him wise or white, for the formal effect of a form is the form itself communicated. Therefore divine relations or Persons exist through the absolute existence of the essence. The first part of the consequence is proved: What already exists does not need another existence, for through the first it is beyond nothingness and beyond all causes; therefore relative existences are superfluous. The second part of the same consequence is proved: First, it is impossible that what is once beyond nothingness and beyond all causes (which is the formal effect of existence) be placed again beyond all causes; secondly, there cannot be two ultimate actualities, or two ultimate terms of the same order and nature, because then neither would be ultimate. But existence is the ultimate actuality and the ultimate term of a thing. Therefore.

Article III. Whether Divine relations, beyond the absolute perfection of the essence, confer another relative perfection.

I say: Divine relations, beyond the absolute perfection of the essence, which they implicitly include, do not confer by virtue of their relative concept another relative perfection, virtually distinct from the absolute. Thus the Thomists against the Thomists. Proof 1. Something is good and perfect insofar as it either is in the act of existence, or expresses an order to existence. But divine relations by virtue of the concept of "To," and as they are pure relations to a term, neither exist, nor express an order to existence, but only if the concept of "In," or by reason of the divine essence, which they include. Therefore: The major is from St. Thomas 1. p.

q. 5., and is evident, because the will is not moved toward something except under the order to existence, and only that is good and perfect which the will desires. The minor is also from the Holy Doctor q. 2. de pot. a. 5. where he says: "Relation, as relation, does not have it that it is something, but only that it is toward something." It is further evident by reason, because relation, according to what is proper to it, and insofar as it is a pure respect, regards nothing except by ordering to a term, because its whole being is to be related to another; but it cannot order its existence to a term, because the existence of relation is not toward a term, but toward a subject: Therefore by reason of itself, and by virtue of the concept of "To," it does not express an order to existence, but abstracts from it.

Proof 2. The notion of perfection must be taken in relation to a subject considered by reason of itself, and as resting in it; but relation by virtue of its proper concept does not regard any subject by reason of itself and as resting in it, but by reason of the term. Therefore. The minor is from St. Thomas here a. 2., where he puts the difference between relation and other genera, that in other genera besides relation, as quantity and quality, even the proper notion of the genus is taken according to comparison to the subject by reason of itself, and to itself, thus quantity is said to be the measure of substance, quality the disposition of substance; but the proper notion of relation is not taken according to comparison to the subject by reason of itself, and as resting in it, but by comparison to something outside, namely the term. It is also evident by reason, because by the very fact that a concept is relative, although it regards a subject, nevertheless it regards it by ordering it to a term, and by reason of the term, because its whole being is to be related to

another. But the major is proved: Perfection must regard the perfectible subject by commensuration with it. But if it does not regard the subject by reason of itself, but by reason of the term, it will not be commensurate with it, but with the term, which is the reason for regarding the subject. Therefore.

Proof 3. from inconveniences. If relations in the divine contribute and multiply relative perfection, it follows, 1. that there will be three magnitudes, three goodnesses, three perfections, consequently three great ones, three good ones, three perfect ones substantively, against Augustine 1. 5. de Trin. c. 8. It follows, 2. that all three Persons will be something more perfect, at least extensively, than one, against the same Augustine 1. 6. de Trin. c. 8, and 1. 8. c. 1., and sermon 38. de tempore, where he says: "The Father alone is as great as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together." It follows, 3. that none will have absolutely every perfection: For Filiation would be lacking to the Father, and the relative perfection of filiation, just as Paternity would be lacking to the Son, and the relative perfection of paternity; for just as there is relative opposition between relations, so between relative perfections. Therefore the Father will not be formally infinitely perfect, nor will the Son be. It follows that equality between the Divine Persons is destroyed. Proof: 1. By the very fact that paternity is a relative perfection distinct from filiation, it must be distinguished from it in species, or quasi-species, and essentially, both because paternity and filiation do not differ only in number, as two paternities, or two filiations, and because merely numerical distinction is drawn from potentiality and matter, which are not in God; hence whatever differs in God, differs in species and essentially; but what differs in species and essentially from another, is

necessarily of unequal perfection with it, because species are like numbers, one of which either exceeds or is always exceeded by the other. Proof: 2. In this hypothesis, the Father and the Son would be more perfect than the Holy Spirit, because the Father beyond the perfection of paternity, and the Son beyond the perfection of filiation, would have the perfection of active spiration; but the Holy Spirit would have only one perfection, namely of passive spiration. Therefore.

DISSERTATION IV.

ON THE DIVINE PERSONS IN COMMON, THEIR PLURALITY, THE MANNER OF SPEAKING ABOUT THEM, AND THEIR NOTIONS. (ST. THOMAS Q. 29 TO 38)

Article I. What is a person? is it the same as hypostasis and subsistence? does it properly exist in the Divine, and what does it signify?

Question 1: What is a person? Response: Person is correctly defined by Boethius in his book "On the Two Natures" as "an individual substance of a rational nature." St. Thomas defends this definition here, as do theologians commonly. Note that judgment about a name should not be based on that from which it is derived, but on that which it is imposed to signify. Hence, although the name "person" derives its etymology from "personando" [sounding through] and representing, it has nevertheless by common usage been extended to signify substantively the human beings themselves, which usage is frequent in civil law and also in Scripture, as is evident in Wisdom 6, Acts 10, and elsewhere. The definition is explained: "substance" is used as the genus and stands for a complete substance; hence not only accidents but also parts, whether integral or essential, indeed

even the rational soul in its separated state, are excluded from the notion of person. "Individual" is placed as the difference, that is, so singular as to be incommunicable. Therefore, Richard of St. Victor adds the term "incommunicable" to the definition of person for the sake of greater clarity.

Furthermore, according to St. Thomas in ad Hannib. at 5 q. unic. a. 3, Person excludes a threefold communicability, namely: that of a universal to its inferiors, because it is singular; that of a part to the whole, because it is a complete substance; and that of a nature to a suppositum, because it is ultimately terminated. Hence, the humanity of Christ is excluded from the notion of Person because, although it is singular insofar as the singular is opposed to the universal, it is nevertheless not incommunicable to a suppositum. Likewise, the divine essence, as pre-understood to the Persons, because although it subsists with an absolute subsistence, it is nevertheless communicable to them. However, the relative subsistences in God are truly Persons because, although the nature under them is communicable, the Person itself, or the nature reduplicatively as personated, is not communicable. Thus, the Person of the Father, or the nature as in the Father, is not communicable to the Son, and this suffices in the divine for the notion of Person, although perhaps it would not suffice in human matters.

It is said "of a rational or intellectual nature" because although other substantial composites of irrational natures have their subsistence and are supposita, they are not, nor are they called persons; for we speak of the suppositum of a lion or a stone, not a person, because, as we have said, the name person carries with it a certain dignity, and is therefore appropriated only to intellectual supposita. Hence you may

infer that hypostasis and subsistence have a broader scope than person, for what hypostasis and subsistence signify in the whole genus of substances, the name Person signifies in the genus of rational substances.

Question 2: Can divine persons be called three substances, just as they are called three hypostases or three persons? The reason for doubt is that person is defined through substance. Before responding, note that substance according to etymology is said in two ways: either from sustaining, or from subsisting, that is, existing per se. Given this, the Response is: If taken in the first sense, Augustine rightly said in book 7 of On the Trinity, ch. 5, that God is improperly called substance, because He does not underlie any accidents; if taken in the second way, it certainly is most fitting for God, because He is being from Himself, subsisting most perfectly per se and independent of everything else.

This concerns substance according to that from which the name is imposed; if, however, it is considered according to that for which it is imposed to signify, according to different nations there was a diverse signification, and thus equivocation. The Greeks used the term for person and hypostasis; hence they said there are three substances in God, as Augustine testifies in book 5 of On the Trinity, ch. 8, with these words: "Most of our people who discuss these matters in Greek have agreed to say one essence, three substances." The Latins, however, used this word for essence, as the same Augustine testifies in chapter 9 with these words: "But because our manner of speaking has already established that what we understand when we say essence is the same as what we understand when we say substance, we dare not say one essence, three substances, but one essence or substance." Therefore, to remove

equivocation and occasion for error, and because we are among Latins, for whom substance primarily signifies essence, we should not simply say that there are three substances in God, but with a qualifier removing equivocation, e.g., three individual substances, for this is nothing other than saying three incommunicable supposita.

Question 3: Is the notion of person properly found in the divine? Response: Affirmative. It is defined as a matter of faith in the Second Council of Toledo and the Lateran Council, chapter "Firmiter," received by the universal Church singing from the Athanasian Creed: "The Person of the Father is one, that of the Son another, and that of the Holy Spirit another." And it is evident from all that we have said concerning the truth of this mystery in the preliminary Dissertation. Reason concurs: Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature, insofar as it imports both an intellectual nature, which is the most perfect of all natures, and a mode of existing per se, which is the most dignified of all. But whatever is of perfection is properly found in God; therefore.

Question 4: What does the name Person signify in the divine? Response: Person in general does not signify relation, but substance; for Person in general is an individual substance of a rational nature. In the divine, however, it signifies relation, not as it is formally and explicitly relation, or respect to a term, but as it is substantially subsisting, because person in the divine is constituted by relation as subsisting, as we shall say shortly. From this it follows that the name person, even when said of the divine, is not a relative name but an absolute one, because although it signifies relation, it does not signify it as formally relation, or by way of the relative, but by way of the subsisting.

Article II. Whether the Divine persons are constituted by relations.

Note 1: Relation imports a twofold concept, namely the concept of "in" and the concept of "toward." The first is common to all accidents, and in the divine to all relations, with this difference: that in created relations it imports inherence, because it is an accident; in the divine it imports subsistence, because it is a substance, identified with the divine nature. Hence, the foundation of divine relation as real is not something real and distinct, as in created things, but the very identification with the divine nature. The concept of "toward" is specific to relation, and by it different relations are distinguished from each other, insofar as they express respects to different terms.

Note 2: In the very concept of "toward" a twofold ratio can again be distinguished: first, insofar as it is a relative entity in itself, or in the signified act, and affecting the subject as a quo; second, insofar as it actually refers the subject as a quod to the term. For it is prior to conceive relation in itself entitatively affecting the subject as a quo, than to actually refer it to the term, although they are simultaneous in time.

Nevertheless, the concept of "toward" affecting the subject as a quo does not coincide with the concept of "in." For the latter pertains not only to the line of relative being, but also to that of absolute being, because it imports not just the inherence or subsistence of "toward," but also the intrinsic predicates of created or uncreated being. So that if it is a created and accidental relation, it imports not only inherence, but also the notion of limited being, dependent being, and all perfection and imperfection of such an

accident; if it is an uncreated relation, the concept of "in" imports not only subsistent and real being, but also the divine entity itself with all attributes and perfections which are included in the divine, with this distinction however: that those things which are of perfection and pertain to the notion of being and existing do not pass over to the concept of "toward," nor are they multiplied in its ratio, because everything that is of divinity and perfection remains one and common to the three Persons, and in this the relations are not opposed. But being subsistent and real pass over to "toward" itself, and are multiplied in its formal ratio, because relations are multiplied in the ratio of subsistence and reality. In the ratio of subsistence, because termination that is incommunicable pertains to subsistence, but incommunicability is had through opposition, and consequently through "toward" itself as "toward." In the ratio of reality, because the term is really respected, and not only by reason, unlike a relation of reason. In a word, whatever pertains to perfection and to being in divine relations holds itself on the part of "in," and is not multiplied in the relations, but is found in them identically. But whatever is of opposition, such as relation, subsistence, Personality, even if it is real, pertains to "toward" itself, as implicitly distinguished from "in," and is formally found in that concept of "toward"; yet in such a way that reality itself arises from "in" itself, just as in created relations it arises from the foundation; but in the divine, the being or reality of relation does not depend on a foundation, but on identification with the divine essence. The foundation, such as active generation, is required only for the exercise of relation in respecting and attaining the term. From John of

St. Thomas we have drawn these few points for understanding this difficult question.

I say: The divine Persons are constituted by relations not under the concept of exercised form referring, but under the concept of entity or form affecting the subject and hypostatically subsisting. This is proven by reason, which simultaneously refutes various opinions. The divine Persons are constituted by something real; but that real thing in the divine cannot be anything other than relation; therefore. The major premise is established: for the divine persons are real and really distinguished from each other independently of the intellect, and they are constituted by that by which they are and are distinguished. The minor premise is proven: All real things that we can conceive in divine persons are either the persons themselves considered in their totality, or something absolute common to all, or something notional proper to each, and this notional is threefold, namely, origin, unbegottenness with respect to the Person of the Father (about which there is the greatest difficulty), and relation; but of all these rationes none except relation can constitute a divine person; therefore. Each part of the minor premise must be proven.

The first part of the minor premise is proven against Praepositinus and Gregory of Rimini. Divine persons are constituted in the ratio of such a person by that by which they are distinguished from one another; but the divine persons are not distinguished from one another in their totality, otherwise they would differ in essence and in the essence in which they nevertheless agree; therefore. Hence in the Lateran Council, chapter "Firmiter," it is said: "The Most Holy Trinity is undivided according to common essence, but discrete according to personal properties." And in the

Council of Florence, session 1, it is asserted that the divine Persons differ by their properties. Hence this opinion of Praepositinus, which St. Thomas mentions below in q. 32, a. 2, is commonly rejected by theologians and noted with various censures. The second part of the minor premise is proven: What is common to the three persons cannot constitute a special person distinct from the others; but all absolutes in God are common to the three persons, as all theologians admit; therefore. Hence this opinion, which is attributed to John of Ripa, Lichetus, and a few ancient writers, has now been banished from the schools as at least erroneous and rash. The third part of the minor premise is proven: First, that the person of the Father is not constituted by unbegottenness, against Vasquez and Alarcon: because unbegottenness is taken either formally or fundamentally. If formally, then it posits nothing, but states only the negation of a principle, yet the person of the Father is real and is constituted by something real; if taken fundamentally, that is, for the foundation of such negation, either that foundation is absolute, and thus incapable of constituting a person, as we have said, or it is relative, which can be nothing other than the relation of paternity.

The third part of the minor premise is proven again, namely, that persons are not constituted by active and passive origins—an opinion commonly attributed to St. Bonaventure. First, it is against the ratio of origin that it should constitute a person; therefore. The antecedent is proven: Active origin presupposes the person from which it proceeds, for actions belong to supposita, and it is prior for a person to be than for a person to operate; therefore it does not constitute the person. Passive origin, however, is presupposed to the constitution of the person, because it is

the way to constituting it, hence it cannot be said to constitute it formally, but only virtually and causally, just as Peter is constituted formally as a human by humanity, but only virtually and causally by birth. Yet we are inquiring here about the formal constitutive; therefore.

It remains, therefore, that relation alone is the constitutive of the divine persons, because it alone is their mutual distinguishing factor; it alone distinguishes because it alone brings opposition and incommunicability, for all absolutes are common to the three persons. Hence that celebrated saying of Boethius: "Substance provides unity, relation multiplies Trinity"; and that common saying of Anselm: "All things in the divine are one and the same where there is no opposition of relation." And in the Second Council of Toledo, in the confession of faith, it is stated: "In the relation of persons, number is discerned," and further on: "They indicate number only in that they are related to one another."

By relation, I say, persons are constituted, not indeed by relation in exercised act, or conceived as a form actually and exercised regarding or as it were embracing the term as a quod, since in this way it presupposes the person and follows generation, but by relation in signified act conceived as a quo according to quiddity insofar as affecting the subject, and indeed substantially, as being identified with the divine nature, under which concept it has the ratio of a hypostatic and subsisting form. Note these things diligently for solving difficult objections.

Article III. Whether in God, considered in Himself and pre-understood to the persons, there is

some absolute subsistence, and besides that, are there three relative subsistences.

Subsistence imports four things: 1. Singularity, for things in the universal do not subsist. 2. A mode of existing per se independently of another sustaining, which is called perseity of independence. 3. A mode of existing incommunicably, or the incommunicability of nature as subjected and terminated to another term and suppositum, which is called perseity of incommunicability. 4. The concrete itself of nature by mode of having it and as the principle quod of operations.

I say first: In God considered in Himself and pre-understood to relations and persons, there exists an absolute subsistence, by which He exists per se independently of another sustaining, and is constituted as the principle quod of operation. Thus Augustine in book 7 of On the Trinity, chapter 4, Jerome in Epistle 57 to Damasus, Cyril of Alexandria, and others, but especially St. Thomas. Proof: God considered in Himself, and pre-understood to relations and persons, is truly subsisting; but not by relative and personal subsistence; therefore by essential and absolute subsistence. The minor premise is evident. The major premise, in which is the difficulty, is proven in multiple ways: 1. God considered in Himself, and as pre-understood to persons, creates and operates ad extra, otherwise the works of the Trinity ad extra would not be undivided; likewise, He is understood as understanding and willing in that priority; therefore also as subsisting. The consequence is evident because, since subsistence is a substantial act, it belongs by nature prior to operation, which by common conception is not a substantial act. Hence St. Thomas says

below in q. 75, a. 2: "Nothing can operate per se unless it subsists per se," and that common axiom: "Actions belong to subsistents." 2. To subsist indicates the highest perfection, for it signifies the most perfect mode of being, but to God considered in Himself and pre-understood to persons, since He is pure act and infinite, belongs all perfection; therefore. 3. To God antecedently to persons belongs being or existing per se; therefore also subsisting. The consequence is evident because by absolute subsistence we understand nothing other than perseity of independence or existing per se, and existence per se presupposes subsistence, for to exist per se is the act of the subsisting.

However, it should be observed that just as we do not simply say three substances, lest occasion be given for error, but with a qualification, e.g., three individual or relative substances, so similarly to remove equivocation, we do not simply say one subsistence, but one absolute subsistence, or with some other similar qualification, denoting that we are speaking of absolute subsistence.

Moreover, for the solution of objections, it should be noted that in created nature, the same form can provide what is of perfection, namely perseity of independence, and what is of mere incommunicability. In God, however, what is of perfection cannot be provided except by the essence, and what is of incommunicability cannot arise except from Relations, both because Relations express no perfection, and because even if they did, they presuppose the divine Essence existing in a perfect mode in the absolute line, and therefore as subsisting. And although the divine nature demands to exist in Relations, this is not from indigence in order to exist per se, for it has this by reason of itself, but from its infinite

fecundity, by reason of which it demands to exist in three Persons.

I say secondly: Besides absolute subsistence, there are in God three relative and personal subsistences. This is against Durandus and certain others. Thus St. Thomas here in q. 29, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: "Just as we say in the divine plurally three persons and three subsistences, so the Greeks say three hypostases." And below in q. 40, a. 3, ad 2: "By paternity, the Father is not only Father but also person, and is someone, or hypostasis." The first reason a priori: According to the Catholic faith, in God there are three persons, three hypostases, three supposita; but person, hypostasis, suppositum are formally constituted by subsistence; therefore in the divine there are three subsistences. The consequence is proven: the multiplication of a substantive name, such as suppositum and person, requires multiplication of form. Hence, if there were given in God only one subsistence, even if modified by three relations, just as there is given one nature modified by three relations, we could no more say in the divine three persons than three Gods, but we would be obliged to acknowledge only one person because of the unity of subsistence. Indeed, we could not even say three subsisting ones adjectivally, as we now say three divine ones, because adjectival names are not multiplied unless the suppositum is multiplied, e.g., the same man having several arts is not called several artisans. But if subsistence is not multiplied, the suppositum, which is formally constituted by subsistence, as we were just saying, would not be multiplied.

The second reason a priori: It belongs to the ratio of subsistence as such, as it abstracts from the communicable and the incommunicable, to render nature as having being

by way of a whole subsisting and as a principle quod of acting, for actions belong to subsistents, and for this reason we admit in God, pre-understood to Persons, an absolute subsistence, by which He is constituted the principle quod of essential and common actions. But in God there are not only essential and common operations of the whole Trinity, but also notional operations proper to the divine Persons, such as to generate for the Father, to spirate for the Son, to be spirated for the Holy Spirit; therefore there must be given not only diverse modes of incommunicability, but true and distinct relative subsistences, by which are constituted diverse principles quod of these notional actions, namely, the Father as the principle quod of active generation, the Son as the principle quod of active spiration, and indeed also the Holy Spirit as the terminus qui of this spiration, because just as the principle quod, so also the terminus qui of this action must be subsisting; for just as actions, so also passions, or quasi-passions, belong to subsistents.

The third reason a posteriori is taken from the Mystery of the Incarnation. Human nature was united to the Word not in something common to it and the other Persons, otherwise the three Persons would be incarnate, but in something proper to it. But it was united in its personal subsistence, which took the place of created subsistence; therefore there exists in the Son a personal subsistence, virtually distinct from the absolute; if in the Son, by the same reasoning in the Father and the Holy Spirit.

From what has been said, the difference between divine existence and subsistence is evident. For by the very fact that the Persons are once placed outside all causes and outside of nothing by absolute existence, they cannot be placed by other existences, which are superfluous, indeed

impossible. But subsistence not only has to give perseity of independence and constitute the principle quod of essential actions, but also to give perseity of incommunicability and constitute the principle quod of notional actions. Since, therefore, absolute subsistence cannot confer both of these latter, it must be sought from respective subsistence.

Article IV. Concerning what pertains to unity or plurality in divine matters with respect to the manner of speaking. (St. Thomas, Q. 31)

I declare, and establish as a general rule with our Bapt. Gonet: Those things which belong to the persons by reason of essence alone are spoken of only in the singular; those which belong to them only by reason of relations are spoken of only in the plural; those which finally belong to them by reason of both essence and relations are spoken of in both singular and plural. The reason for this rule is evident; because relation is multiplied in divine matters, while essence remains one and unmultiplied; therefore, those things which belong to the persons by reason of essence retain unity and are predicated in the singular; those which belong by reason of relations are multiplied and are predicated in the plural; those which belong by reason of both are spoken of in the singular insofar as they belong by reason of essence, and in the plural insofar as they belong by reason of relations. The Council of Toledo also establishes this in its profession of faith with these few words: "Only that which they are in relation to each other suggests number, and in this they lack number, in what they are in themselves."

From this general rule it follows: 1. We speak of three persons in the divine, not one person, because the concept of person is taken for a subsisting relation. The same applies to hypostasis, which in the common understanding of the Church is now taken for person. Otherwise with the term "individual," because in individuals nature is divided, not in persons. For person in its formal significance conveys personality, and materially conveys nature; conversely, individual formally conveys nature, and materially personality. Nevertheless, we can say three divine, three eternal, three omnipotent, three good, etc., if these terms are taken adjectively, as they are in the Lateran Council Firmiter and elsewhere. Otherwise if they are taken substantively, as Athanasius took them in the Creed, saying: "Not three eternals, but one eternal"; because for the multiplication of a substantive name, multiplication of both form and supposit is required.

It follows 2. That subsistence is spoken of as both one and plural, because subsistence taken for the per se existence of independence belongs by reason of nature; taken for the per se existence of incommunicability, it belongs by reason of relation. Conversely, existence is spoken of only in the singular, because it belongs to the persons by reason of essence, as we have proven.

It follows 3. That entity, thing, reality are spoken of in both singular and plural, namely one thing which is essence, many things or realities which are relations, because entity, thing, and reality are taken for being not fictitious but established. Similarly, being concretely, if taken as that which has entity and is opposed to nothing, is also multiplied substantively, because truly the relations are three beings, three real entities, not fictitious ones. But if being is taken

concretely as that which has essence or existence, it is not multiplied substantively, because there is only one essence or existence in the three persons, but only adjectively, insofar as they are three having essence or existence.

It follows 4. That God can be called triune, not triple, or that in God there is Trinity, not triplicity. Triune or Trinity precisely denotes the number three or of three, which truly is found in divine matters. However, one can say triple person, double procession, because by adding person or procession, the multiplicity of nature is sufficiently excluded.

It follows 5. That the Son can be said to be "one thing" (unum) with the Father, not "one person" (unus), and conversely that he can be said to be "another" (alius) than the Father, not "another thing" (aliud), because neuter nouns are appropriated to nature, and masculine nouns to supposits or persons. Hence you may also infer that in divine matters "something" (aliquid) is not multiplied, because it means "another what" (aliud quid). However, the holy Doctor prudently warns that to avoid the error of Arius we should not use these terms: diverse, unequal, different, alien, discrepant, divided, separate, because they imply diversity in nature. We can, however, use the terms distinction and distinct, because these terms are very general and common, and signify only some distinction in general. Therefore, when in some Fathers you read "diverse," interpret it benignly as "distinct." To avoid the error of Sabellius, these terms should be avoided: singular, unique, confused, solitary; because they seem to remove the distinction and order of persons, and in that sense the Sabellians understood and used them. However, where there would be no danger of error, one would not be at fault who used some of the listed terms, intending to signify the unity not of person but of nature;

hence we read in the 11th action of the Sixth Synod "the singularity of the Deity."

It follows 6. That this exclusive particle "alone," if taken as applying its meaning, namely solitude, to the subject, so that it means the same as solitary and without company, has no place in divine matters. Hence these propositions are false: "God is alone," "The Father is alone," because neither God nor the Father is without company or consortium. But if "alone" is taken as not applying its meaning to the subject, but denoting the order of the predicate to the subject, and is precisely exclusive, it has place in divine matters; as if you say, "God alone is eternal," the sense is that eternity does not belong to others besides God.

It should be noted, however, that when it is joined to a personal term, other persons are excluded only with respect to those things in which they have relative opposition, by which alone they are distinguished, not with respect to those things in which they do not have such opposition, since in these they are one and the same. Hence when it is said "the Father alone generates," the Son and the Holy Spirit are excluded, because in generation the Father has relative opposition immediately with the Son, as has been said, and mediately with the Holy Spirit, as we shall say below. But when it is said, "the Father alone knows the Son," or as it is said in Matthew 11, "No one knows the Son except the Father," the Son or the Holy Spirit is not thereby excluded, because in such knowledge they do not have opposition, but such knowledge is one and the same in all.

Article V. Concerning the Divine notions.

A notion in divine matters is nothing other than the proper way of knowing a divine Person, or the objective reason notifying the Person, whence it is conceived as a mark by which one Person is distinguished from others, so that just as we say God is one by essence or Deity, so the Father is constituted by paternity and distinguished from the Son.

Three things are required for the true understanding of the notions of divine Persons: 1. That it pertain to origin, because Persons are constituted and distinguished only by relations founded in origin. 2. That it pertain to dignity, or at least denote dignity, because Person is a name of dignity. 3. That it be something special, and a reason for discerning one Person from another.

Notion, relation, and property in Divine matters are one and the same thing; however, there is this difference between them: that relation belongs to this thing or formality with respect to its correlative; property with respect to the Person whose property it is; notion with respect to the intellect to which it manifests the Person.

I say: There are in divine matters five notions, no more, no fewer, namely Innascibility, Paternity, Filiation, Active Spiration, and Passive Spiration or procession. Proof: The five assigned, no more, no fewer, meet the three conditions required for a true notion. Therefore. Proof of the antecedent: Although innascibility presents itself as a negation, it nevertheless denotes and circumlocutes a great dignity, namely to be from no one, but to be from oneself, and to be the head and font of divine emanations. Moreover, it is proper to the Father, because by innascibility we understand not only the negation of generation, but of all procession whatsoever from another, which belongs to the Father alone. Finally, it pertains to origin negatively, in the

way that negation reductively pertains to the genus of affirmation, as non-man to the genus of Man. Concerning Paternity, the matter is clear; for it is proper to the Father, signifies his dignity, and pertains to origin. Similarly concerning Filiation, for it imports a perfection proper to the Son, founded in origin, by which he is constituted and separated from other Persons. The same applies to passive spiration, or Procession with respect to the Holy Spirit. Active spiration, although it is a perfection common to the Father and the Son, is nevertheless proper to them with respect to the Holy Spirit. Therefore.

Objection: The concept of Image and Word with respect to the Son, the concept of gift and love with respect to the Holy Spirit, are concepts proper to them by which they are known. Therefore they are also notions. Response: I distinguish the consequent. Therefore they are also notions indistinct from Filiation and Procession, I concede; distinct, I deny. I grant that these names belong respectively to the Son and the Holy Spirit, yet they do not constitute different notions, because they are included in the adequate concept of Son and Holy Spirit, which needs several names to be explained. Thus the Son, to show that he is consubstantial, is called Son; to show that he is completely similar, he is called Image; to show that he is coeternal, he is called splendor; to show that he is immaterially begotten, he is called Word. But no single name could be found by which all these things could be designated. Say the same proportionally of the Holy Spirit.

Corollary.

Concerning properties, powers, and notional acts.

From what has been said, you may gather that although notions are the same formalities as relations and properties, not every notion is a property or relation. Indeed, active spiration, although it is a notion of the Father and the Son, is not a property strictly speaking, since it is common to two Persons; and innascibility is not a relation, and although it is strictly a property of the Father or Person, it is not a personal property, because it is not constitutive of him in the sense of Person, which is what we understand by personal property. Hence you have that although there are five assigned notions, there are nevertheless only four properties, namely Innascibility, Paternity, Filiation, and Procession; three personal properties: Paternity, Filiation, and Passive Spiration or Procession; and four relations: Paternity, Filiation, Active Spiration, and Passive Spiration.

Query 1: How many notional acts are there? Response: There are two, namely generation and active spiration, to which correspond a dual notional power, namely intellective and spirative.

Query 2: How many notional names are there? Response: There are three proper to each Person. To the First: Father, Unbegotten or innascible, and principle. To the Second: Son, Image, Word. To the Third: Spirit, Gift, and Love.

DISSERTATION V
ON THE DIVINE PERSONS IN PARTICULAR. (ST. THOMAS, Q. 33 TO 38)

Article I. Concerning the person of the Father

The question is whether it is proper to the Father to be a principle. Note that although the Greeks use the terms cause and principle indifferently in Divine matters, because they do not take cause strictly as that which effects and has some essential diversity from the effect, but as that which signifies that from which something is, in whatever way it may be; the Latins, however, commonly use the term principle, both because for them cause corresponds to effect, and no Divine Person is made; and because among Gentile philosophers the name cause, when said of God, designates His relation to creatures, for they say that God is the first Cause, and creatures are His caused things. The name principle is used in Divine matters in two ways, either essentially in relation to creatures, or notionally, as attributed to one Person in relation to another. Although they say the Father is a principle, nevertheless, because of the Arian heresy, they do not say the Son is principiated, because to be principiated seems to imply some inferiority and diminution. With these points noted:

I respond: If the name principle is taken notionally, it especially belongs to the Father. Proof: Although this name principle, as to that from which it is imposed, seems taken from priority, nevertheless it is not imposed to signify priority, but origin, hence although the Father is not prior to the Son, He is nevertheless His principle. But since the Father is that from whom the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed, and He Himself proceeds from no one, it follows that He is a principle without principle. The Son, however, although the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him, nonetheless He Himself proceeds from the Father, hence He is a principle with a principle. Therefore.

The second question is whether the name Father is proper to the first divine person? I respond affirmatively. This is evident: 1. From Psalm 88: "He shall cry to me: You are my Father." 2. It is evident from reason: because the proper name of any person signifies that by which that person is distinguished from others. But that by which the first divine person is distinguished from others is paternity. Therefore, this name Father is proper to Him.

The third question is whether being unbegotten is proper to the Father? I respond affirmatively, because by the name Unbegotten here we do not understand what is not from another through generation, for in this way it would also pertain to the Holy Spirit; but we understand what is not from another in any way whatsoever, whether through generation or in any other way, or what is entirely unproducible; in this sense unbegotten is proper to the Father, since He is a principle without principle, the Son a principle with a principle, the Holy Spirit a principle from both.

Article II. On the person of the Son. (St. Thomas, Q. 34-35)

The first question is: What are the various names by which the second Person of the Trinity is designated? I respond: There are three principal ones, namely Son, Word, and Image. Although these three are entirely one and the same without virtual distinction, they are nevertheless distinguished according to the mode of signifying, and in relation to different extrinsic connotations. Son is said in relation to the Father. Word in relation to the intellect, to which it manifests known things. Image in relation to the principle which it imitates: which has already been discussed above when treating of processions, and by St. Thomas in the cited place.

The second question is: From the knowledge of which things does the Word per se proceed from the Father? I respond: 1. The Word proceeds per se from the knowledge not only of essence and attributes, but of relations and possible creatures. Proof: 1. From SS. Augustine and Thomas. For St. Augustine in Book 15 of De Trinitate, ch. 14, says of the Father: "God the Father knows all things"; and of the Word: "He is born from the knowledge of the Father." St. Thomas here in q. 34, a. 1, ad 4 says: "The Father, by understanding Himself, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and all other things contained in His knowledge, conceives the Word, so that thus the entire Trinity is spoken by the Word and also every creature." Understand this as referring to natural and necessary knowledge, which is only of possibles, as I will say in the second response, and as is evident from that other testimony of St. Thomas, ibid. a. 3: "God," he says, "by knowing Himself knows every creature. The Word

therefore conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood, hence in us there are diverse words according to the diverse things that we understand. But because God by one act understands both Himself and all things, His unique Word is expressive not only of the Father, but also of creatures. And as God's knowledge is only cognitive of God, but both cognitive and capable of making creatures, so the Word of God is only expressive of that which is in God the Father, but of creatures it is both expressive and operative." You see the holy Doctor does not say "making" or "about to make," but "capable of making" and "operative," and therefore he does not speak of free knowledge, by which future things are or come to be, but of necessary knowledge, by which things can be made.

I respond 2: The Word does not proceed per se from the knowledge of future creatures, but only concomitantly and accidentally. Because the knowledge from which the Word per se proceeds must be prior in origin to the Father than to the Word; but the knowledge of future things does not belong to the Father prior in origin to the Word, because it presupposes a decree, which is common to the three persons, and does not belong prior in origin to one than to another. Therefore.

Objection: From this opinion it necessarily follows that the Word is prior to itself, and that the Holy Spirit is both prior and posterior to the Word. The Word is prior to itself, because it is known intuitively as existing before it proceeds. The Holy Spirit is prior to the Word, because He is known intuitively as existing before the Word proceeds, and is posterior to the Word, because He proceeds from it. Therefore.

This imperfect way of understanding arises from the weakness of our mind, which cannot grasp the reason of the divine Processions. Priority among divine Persons is only priority of origin, and from which, or of order, and of reason, in no way priority of duration or in which; for they exist simultaneously in the same now of eternity, so that the priority of order and of our reason in no way prevents their coexistence, nor consequently intuitive knowledge. If you wish to play with priority of order and reason, distinguish thus: The Word is prior to itself, the Holy Spirit is prior and posterior to the Word under the same aspect, I deny; under different aspects, I concede. The Word as known is prior to itself as proceeding; the Spirit as known is prior to the Word, as proceeding is posterior. But these priorities are figments of our reason. Indeed, on the part of reality once and simultaneously from eternity the Word and the Holy Spirit are known and proceed.

Article III. On the Person of the Holy Spirit.

§ I. Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. St. Thomas, q. 36.

That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father is the common and certain faith, which Scripture expressly teaches in John 15: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father"; and which the First Council of Constantinople definitively defined against the Arians and Macedonians, who, reducing the Son and the Holy Spirit to the order of creatures, said that the Son was made by the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit by the Son alone, by adding to the Nicene

Creed these particles concerning the Holy Spirit, "who proceeds from the Father." But the Greeks deny that He proceeds from the Son, yet they do not deny every respect of the Holy Spirit to the Son; for they grant that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and is from the Father through the Son, indeed that He is from the Son, that He flows forth, springs forth, emanates, is breathed from the Son, yet not that He proceeds from Him, because they think this implies two principles, and that the Father and Son are not a single principle of His procession, since for them "to proceed" designates procession from a principle that does not proceed from another; hence the question seems almost one of terminology, arising from ignorance or stubbornness.

I say (here, and against the Gentiles ch. 2): The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Proof 1. From the authority of Scripture. Scripture asserts three things, which cannot stand if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. First, that the Holy Spirit receives from the Son; Second, that the Son sends the Holy Spirit; Third, that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son. Therefore: 1. The Holy Spirit receives from the Son: John 16: "He will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to you." But in divine matters one person does not receive from another, except because it proceeds from that one: therefore. Proof of the minor premise: What someone receives from another is either something accidental or something substantial, but the Holy Spirit does not receive something accidental from the Son, for both are without accidents: therefore something substantial and the substance itself through a substantial action, which is to proceed in substance from the Son. Likewise, the Holy Spirit

receives knowledge from the Son, for from Him He will hear whatever He will announce: but for Him to know is to be, as Augustine says in Tract 99 on John. And it is evident, because knowledge in God is not distinguished from essence as has been said in the Treatise on God.

The Son (Opusc. against the Errors of the Greeks, ch. 32. §. Similarly) sends the Holy Spirit, John 15: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father." And chapter 16: "If I do not go away, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you." But for the Holy Spirit to be sent by the Son is to proceed from Him: therefore. Proof of the minor premise: The sending of one by another happens either as by a superior through command, or as by one wiser through counsel, or through procession or origin as from a principle: but the Holy Spirit is not sent by the Son as by a superior through command, nor as by one wiser through counsel: therefore as from a principle through procession or origin.

The Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son: Acts 16: "When they had come to Mysia, they attempted to go into Bithynia, but the Spirit of Jesus did not allow them." Galatians 4: "God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts"; and elsewhere, from which I argue thus: The Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son in the same way that He is called the Spirit of the Father, Matthew 10: "the Spirit of your Father, who speaks in you." But He is called the Spirit of the Father insofar as He proceeds from the Father: therefore. Likewise, the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, either because He proceeds from the Son, or because the Son proceeds from Him: not the second, therefore the first. Proof of the major premise: The Holy Spirit is not called the Spirit of the Son by reason of subjection or servitude, but

as a coequal person: therefore by reason of origin, because indeed He proceeds from the Son, or the Son from Him, for nothing else can be assigned.

Proof 2. From the Greek Fathers who flourished before the schism, and from the General Councils. St. Athanasius, Oration 3 against the Arians, says, "Whatever the Spirit has, he has from the Word"; and in the Creed inscribed with his name: "The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding." St. Basil, Book 5 against Eunomius, proves that the Holy Spirit is third in order in the Holy Trinity and second from the Son, as having being from Him. St. Epiphanius in the Ancoratus n. 8: "Spirit of the Father and Spirit of the Son... proceeding from the Father and the Son." St. Cyril of Alexandria with the Alexandrian Synod in the Epistle to Nestorius n. 10: "Although the Spirit subsists in His own person, and is considered in Himself insofar as He is and is not the Son, yet He is not alien from Him, since He is named the Spirit of truth, and Christ is the truth, and accordingly He proceeds from Him as well as from God the Father." Moreover, this Epistle of St. Cyril was read and approved in five General Councils: the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th. The same truth was later defined with the Greeks present and consenting at the Lateran IV Council under Innocent III, the Second Lyons Council under Gregory X, and the Florence Council under Eugene IV.

Proof 3. All things in divine matters are common, where relational opposition does not prevent it, as the axiom commonly received holds; but between the Father and the Son there is no relative opposition by reason of active spiration: therefore this is common to both. 2. If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the Son would not have

the whole essence of the Father, and consequently would not be Son, nor coequal to the Father: therefore. Proof of the antecedent: He would not have the same will as the Father, for if He had, He would produce the Holy Spirit through it, just as the Father produces: therefore. 3. If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him, for Persons in divine matters are distinguished only by opposite relations, which are founded in origin, or procession of one from another. Therefore. The Council of Florence principally proves against the Greeks by this very reason that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. "It is" (says John the Theologian, sess. 18) "according to the Doctors, both Greek and Latin, relation alone, which multiplies Persons in divine productions which is called of origin." Nevertheless, the Scotists impugn this same reason, who do not deny that the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by active Spiration, but claim that He is also distinguished by Filiation, so that if active spiration were removed per impossibile, He would still be distinguished.

In the argument presented, they deny the Antecedent, and to the proof they say that the common principle is to be understood of the opposition of relation, either relative or disparate. The opposition of relative relation, says the most learned P. Henno disp. 1. 4. 10, is the repugnance that is found between two relations, which look to each other mutually, as between Paternity and Filiation, active Spiration and passive Spiration. But disparate opposition is the repugnance between two relations, one of which by its formal relation is not really the other, although they do not look to each other, except precisely insofar as one distinctly regards another, from which it is distinguished, and such are Filiation and passive Spiration. And although Paternity and

active Spiration, likewise Filiation and active Spiration are not incompossible in the same supposit, yet the same cannot be produced by two total productions, which however would happen, if a single Person had Filiation and passive Spiration, since it would be the term of generation and spiration. Nevertheless, it does not imply contradiction for the same supposit to have a double total action of two effects, and therefore neither for the Father to generate the Son, and to spirate the Holy Spirit. Thus says the praised Theologian, and in this turns the hinge of the difficulty.

This response of the Scotists does not preserve the Doctrine of the Holy Fathers, and Theologians, and the Council of Florence cited, who unanimously say that Persons are distinguished not by disparation, so to speak, but by opposition; but to invent disparate opposition is to abuse terms against common sense, and to confuse the notions of things. For those things are called disparate, which are not opposed, and because they are not opposed: thus white and hot are called disparate, because they are not opposed; white and black are not called disparate, because they are opposed.

I respond directly against the foundation of the Scotists. When the Scotists say that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, they would nevertheless be really distinct Persons, because there would be two total productions really distinct, but it implies contradiction for the same Person to be produced by two total productions, they beg the question, and prove the same by the same; because there are not two total productions really distinct, except insofar as there are two terms, or two Persons really distinct, for the production of a Person is a Person in becoming. Therefore, to prove that there are two Persons really distinct, because there are two total productions really

distinct, is to prove that there are two Persons, because there are two Persons, which is to beg the question, and to prove the same by the same. It is therefore incumbent on the Scotists to prove that there are two Persons really distinct otherwise than from the distinction of a double total production, which we deny. They do not prove it, and I think they will not prove it. Meanwhile we say that in this hypothesis generation and spiration would be one and the same total production, formally and eminently generative and spirative, only virtually and rationally distinct. And just as in the Father intellect and will is the same entity virtually distinct, likewise active generation and spiration is the same entity virtually distinct, so the Son and the Holy Spirit would be the same Person, which insofar as it would proceed through the intellect would be called Son, insofar as through the will would be called Holy Spirit; just as now one and the same person, insofar as it produces through the intellect is called Father, insofar as through the will, Spirator. Whoever wants more, let him consult St. Thomas q. 10 de potentia a. 5.

Query 1. Whether it is correctly said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son? I respond affirmatively, for thus the Greek Fathers spoke, and among the Latins St. Hilary, book 12 of De Trinitate. The reason is, because the Son has it from the Father that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him: therefore it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son, or what is the same, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son: in which sense it is also said of operations ad extra: John 1: "All things were made through him."

Query 2. Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit? I respond affirmatively. Proof 1.

From the Fathers. Augustine, 5 De Trinitate ch. 15, says, "It must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles." Likewise Basil, book 3 against Eunomius, Anselm, book on the procession of the Holy Spirit. Proof 2. From the Councils. The Second Council of Lyons says, "We condemn those who with rash daring have presumed to assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles, and not as from one." This is referred to in chapter Fideli on the highest Trinity in 6, and the Council of Florence in the letters of union: "We define that the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son...eternally as from one principle and by one spiration proceeds."

Proof 3. By reasons: 1. The Father and the Son are one in all things, in which relative opposition does not distinguish them; but in this, which is to be the principle of the Holy Spirit, they are not relatively opposed; therefore. 2. Because in the Father and the Son there is one spirative power; hence just as, because in the three persons there is one Deity, they are not called three Gods, so because in the Father and the Son there is one spirative power, they are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Spirit.

From which you may gather that they are also one spirator, because spirator is also a substantive name, although they are several spirating, because spirating is an adjective name: And although the Holy Doctor in 1. d. 11. art. 4. and d. 12. a. 3. said that they are several spirators, just as they are several spirating, taking spirator adjectively, nevertheless "it is better," he says, "to say one spirator, because strictly speaking, spirator should be taken substantively, like creator, begetter and similar terms," and therefore in the same place he explains St. Hilary saying that

the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son as Authors, that he put a substantive for an adjective.

Query 3. Whether this particle Filioque was rightfully added to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed? Against the Greeks contending that this addition could not be made, as the Council of Ephesus forbade it. I respond affirmatively. Because this addition was made by legitimate authority, namely of the Church, and from a necessary cause, namely that the error then more widely spreading among them against the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son might be more effectively repressed. Hence the Greeks themselves at Lyons II approved this addition, and sang the Creed, repeating this addition three times, with the Latins during the solemn Mass. And the Council of Florence, after the cause had been most diligently discussed in the definitions of Faith to which all the Greeks subscribed with the Latins, except Mark of Ephesus, says thus: "We define, moreover, that the explanation of those words Filioque, for the sake of declaring the truth, and because of the imminent necessity at that time, was lawfully and reasonably added to the creed." Therefore.

§ II. On the various names of the Holy Spirit.

Query 1. Whether this name Holy Spirit is proper to the third Person? I respond that if this name Holy Spirit is taken in a complex way, and by virtue of two words, it is common to each Person of the Trinity; for the Father is Spirit and holy, similarly the Son is Spirit and holy. But if it is taken in a non-complex way and by virtue of one word, by the usage of Scripture and the custom of the Church it is accommodated to signify the third Person. And there is a

twofold convenience for this accommodation. The first is because the name Holy Spirit is common to the Father and the Son, as has been said, therefore it is fitting that He who proceeds from both and is the nexus of both should be properly called by the name which they both have in common. The second is because the name Spirit in corporeal things seems to signify a certain impulse and motion, for we call breath and wind Spirit; now it is proper to love, that it moves and impels the will of the lover toward the beloved; holiness, moreover, is attributed to those things which are ordered to God; because, therefore, the third Person proceeds by way of love, by which God is loved, He is fittingly named Holy Spirit.

Query 2. Whether love is the proper name of the Holy Spirit? I respond: If love is taken essentially, as it imports only the relation of the lover to the thing loved, it is a name common to the whole Trinity. If, however, it is taken personally, as it imports the relation of the thing that proceeds by way of love to its principle, it is a name proper to the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the mutual love of the Father and the Son as a certain impression, or impulse toward the thing loved.

Query 3. From the love of which things does the Holy Spirit proceed? I respond: The Holy Spirit per se proceeds from the love of all that is formally in God, namely from the love of essence, attributes, and persons; accidentally and concomitantly from the love of future creatures; in no way from the love of possible creatures. These are evident partly from what we have said about the knowledge from which the word proceeds, partly from what was said about God's love concerning created things in the preceding Tract.

Query 4. Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit? I respond: If to love is taken essentially, (1. p.q. 37. art. 1. o.) the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Spirit, but by their essence, because the Holy Spirit is not essential love, but notional. If, however, to love is taken notionally, the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, because to love notionally is nothing other than to spirate love, just as to speak is to produce a Word, and to flower is to produce flowers; just as therefore a tree is said to flower with flowers, and the Father to speak Himself and creatures by the Word, so the Father and the Son are said to love themselves and us by the Holy Spirit, or by proceeding love.

Query 5. Whether gift is the proper name of the Holy Spirit? Before responding, note that gift can be taken essentially, notionally, and personally. Essentially insofar as it is considered only as a thing that can be given gratuitously, and in this way it belongs to the whole Trinity, and to each person, since they can communicate and give themselves to us gratuitously. Notionally, as it expresses passive origin from the giver, and belongs only to some persons and not to all, and in this way it is proper to the Son and the Holy Spirit, not to the Father, because the Son and the Holy Spirit have origin from the Father, the Father from no one. Personally, as it belongs only to one person. Whence I respond: Gift personally taken is the proper name of the Holy Spirit, because gift properly imports gratuitous donation. The reason for gratuitous donation is love, for we give something to someone gratuitously because we will good to him; therefore the first thing that we give him is the love by which we will good to him, and thus love has the character of the first gift, through which all gratuitous gifts are given.

Therefore since the Holy Spirit, as love, proceeds in the character of the first gift, consequently gift is His proper name.

Among (4. against the gentiles ch. 22) various other names, which are appropriated to the Holy Spirit, singular is the name Paraclete or Consoler. The reason for this appropriation is that it is proper to friendship that someone delights in the presence of a friend, and finds in him consolation against all anxieties, hence in sorrows we flee especially to friends for the sake of consolation. Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit constitutes us as friends of God, and makes Him dwell in us, and us in Him, for the sanctification of souls is appropriated to Him, it follows that through the Holy Spirit we have joy concerning God and consolation against all the infirmities and attacks of the world: hence in Psalm 50 it is said: "Restore to me the joy of your salvation, and strengthen me with a perfect spirit." Some add that He is also called Paraclete because after the ascension of Christ, He descended upon the sorrowful Apostles and the sad Church as a consoler.

DISSERTATION VI

ON THE COMPARISON OF PERSONS TO ESSENCE, TO PERSONAL PROPERTIES, TO EACH OTHER, AND TO CREATURES.

Article I. On the comparison of persons to essence, and to relations, and to notional acts.

Question 1. Whether essential names, that is, those which signify essence, or those pertaining to essence, signifying it plainly without insinuating the persons, are predicated singularly of the three Persons? Response: If essential names signify essence substantively, they are predicated of the three Persons singularly and not plurally; if, however, they signify essence adjectivally, they are predicated of the three Persons in the plural. The reason is that substantive names signify something in the manner of substance; and substance, just as it has being through itself, so it has unity or plurality through itself. Hence the unity or plurality of a substantive name is considered not only according to the suppositum, but also according to the form signified by the name. Adjective names, however, signify something in the manner of an accident, which inheres in a subject. Hence accidents, just as they have being in and from a subject, so from the subject they receive unity or plurality, and therefore in adjectives, singularity or plurality is

considered according to supposita or subjects. Therefore, for the multiplication of a substantive name, multiplication of form and suppositum is required; for the multiplication of an adjective name, multiplication of the suppositum or subject alone is sufficient. And thus in human matters, we call Peter, Paul, and Mark three men, but in divine matters, we do not call the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit three Gods, but one God; because in the three supposita of human nature there are three humanities, but in the three divine Persons there is one divine essence. On the contrary, we say three existing, three wise, three eternal, three uncreated, if they are taken adjectivally, as Athanasius took them in the Creed, saying: "All three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal to themselves." If, however, they are taken substantively, we say one uncreated, one immeasurable, one eternal, etc., as the same Athanasius used them, saying: "Not three uncreated, nor three immeasurable, but one uncreated and one immeasurable."

Question 2. Whether essential names are suitably appropriated to Persons? Appropriation is the attribution of some essential property, common to the three Persons, yet made to one Person for its manifestation. Hence one thing is proper, another is appropriated. That is called proper which is so attributed to one Person that it cannot be attributed to another. That which is appropriated is that which is common to the whole Trinity, but for the sake of greater manifestation is attributed to one Person. With this noted, to the question Response: Affirmative. Proof: Although the Trinity of Persons cannot be demonstrated demonstratively, it is fitting, however, that it be declared through things more manifest. But essential attributes are more manifest to us through reason than the properties of the Persons; because

from creatures, from which we receive knowledge, we can arrive at certain knowledge of essential attributes, but not at certain knowledge of personal properties. Therefore.

Appropriation or manifestation can be made in two ways. One way is through similarity, such as those things that pertain to intellect are appropriated to the Son, who proceeds through intellect; another way is through dissimilarity, such as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because among us fathers are often infirm because of old age, lest we suspect such a thing in God.

The use of appropriation is quite frequent in the Scriptures and the Holy Fathers according to various considerations of God. For God can be considered in four ways: 1. As He is being. 2. As He is one. 3. As power to act is in Him. 4. As He has relation to His effects, and according to these various considerations, appropriations are made in the Scriptures by the Holy Fathers.

According to the first consideration, eternity, according to Saints Hilary and Augustine, is appropriated to the Father, species to the Son, and use to the Holy Spirit. For eternity, insofar as it signifies not being from a principle, has similarity with what is proper to the Father, who is a principle without a principle. Species or beauty has similarity with what is proper to the Son. For beauty requires three things: integrity, proportion, and clarity of color. An image has the nature of that which it represents integrally, and is the light and splendor of the intellect. Use has similarity with what is proper to the Holy Spirit, taking use in a broad sense, as it includes enjoyment under itself. The use, therefore, by which the Father and the Son enjoy each other, is congruent with what is proper to the Holy Spirit, which is love. For the

Father and the Son love each other through the Holy Spirit, as has been said.

According to the consideration of God as one, Augustine (Book 1 of De Doctrina Christiana, chapter 5) appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, and concord or connection to the Holy Spirit. These three things import unity, but differently. For unity is spoken of absolutely, not presupposing anything, and so it is appropriated to the Father, who does not presuppose any person, since He is a principle without a principle. Equality imports unity with respect to another, for that is equal which has one quantity with another, and therefore equality is appropriated to the Son, who is a principle from a principle. Connection, however, imports the unity of two things; hence it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, insofar as He is from two.

According to the third consideration, whereby sufficient power in God is considered for causing, power is appropriated to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. And this appropriation is according to the reason of similarity, if one considers what is in divine persons; according to the reason of dissimilarity, if one considers what is in creatures, lest we suspect something similar in divine Persons. For power has the nature of a principle, hence it has similarity with the heavenly Father, who is the principle of the whole divinity; it is deficient, however, in the earthly father because of old age. Wisdom has similarity with the heavenly Son insofar as He is the Word, which is nothing other than the conception of wisdom; it is sometimes deficient, however, in the earthly son because of the limited time. Goodness, since it is the reason and object of love, has similarity with the divine

Spirit, who is love, but it seems to have repugnance to the earthly spirit, insofar as it imports a certain violence. Consequently, operations in which power is especially manifest, such as the creation of the world, are appropriated to the Father. Operations in which wisdom is especially manifested, such as the restoration and redemption of the world, are appropriated to the Son. And operations in which goodness is singularly manifest, such as the bestowal of graces, are appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

According to the fourth consideration, insofar as God is considered in relation to His effects, that appropriation is taken: "From whom, through whom, and in whom." For this preposition "From" imports a certain relation of efficient causality, which belongs to God by reason of His power, hence it is appropriated to the Father, like power. This preposition "Through," insofar as it designates the relation of form, through which an agent acts, as we say that an artisan acts through his art, is appropriated to the Son like wisdom and art. This preposition "In" finally denotes the relation of containing; God, however, contains things not only according to their likenesses, according to which containment is appropriated to the Son, but also insofar as God in His goodness preserves things and governs them, bringing them to a suitable end: and in this way "In whom" is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, like goodness. Still more appropriations beyond those recounted are found in the Scriptures and Fathers.

Question 3. Whether in the divine, relation is the same as person? Response: Affirmative. In God there are four real relations, as I said in Dissertation 3, article 1, namely Paternity, Filiation, active Spiration, and passive Spiration. Three, namely Paternity, Filiation, and passive

Spiration are called personal properties, because by these the Persons are constituted. The fourth, namely active Spiration, is called a property, because it does not belong to all persons, but is not personal, because it does not constitute a person. But these four relations, both personal and non-personal, are the same as the person, but in different ways.

For understanding this, it must be considered that because of divine simplicity there is in the divine a twofold real identity of those things which differ in created things: because since divine simplicity excludes the composition of form and matter, it follows that in the divine the abstract and the concrete are the same, as Deity and God. Because divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God is His essence, and because of this, wisdom and power are the same in God, because both are in the divine essence. And according to this twofold reason of identity, property, or relation in the divine is the same with the person. For personal properties are the same as the persons for the reason that the abstract is the same as the concrete; for they are the subsisting persons themselves, as Paternity is the Father himself, and Filiation the Son, and Procession the Holy Spirit. Non-personal properties, however, are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity by which that which is attributed to God is His essence. Thus, therefore, common active Spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and with the person of the Son, not that it is one person subsisting per se, but just as one essence is in two persons, so also one property. From this you have that the Relation of Paternity and the Relation of active spiration in the Father are the same according to reality with only a virtual distinction. Similarly, the Relation of filiation and the

relation of active spiration in the Son. For this see Dissertation 3, article 1, conclusion 2.

Question 4. Whether notional acts are preunderstood to properties, or relations according to our way of understanding? Notional acts are the origins themselves, both active and passive, namely active and passive generation, active and passive spiration. With this noted, Response: Passive origins taken simply precede according to our way of understanding relations, or properties of proceeding Persons; because origin passively signified is signified as a way to the Person, and to its properties. Origins, however, or notional acts actively taken precede according to the intellect personal property, or relation precisely as it is relation, or as it says pure respect, for thus it is founded upon the act. However, insofar as Relation or personal property is constitutive of the Person, so it is preunderstood to active origin, because the agent Person is preunderstood to the action. Hence

You will infer 1. that both are truly said: "Because He generates, He is Father" and "because He is Father, He generates." For if by the name of Father is understood precisely relation as pure respect, it is truly said: "Because He generates, He is Father." If, however, relation is understood as subsisting and constituting, it is truly said "Because He is Father, He generates." For a Person is understood to be before it operates. 2. That Relation, or non-personal property, as is active Spiration in the Father and the Son, since it cannot be considered as constituting a Person, but only according to pure respect, is posterior according to the intellect than active origin.

You ask 5. whether notional acts are voluntary? Before the response, note that something can be understood to be

voluntary in two ways: In one way, with a concomitant will, as I can say: I am human by my will, because, namely, it pleases me to be human. 2. With an antecedent and initiating will, or having itself as the principle of the thing, which is said to be done voluntarily, as an artisan is said to operate by will, which is the principle of his work. Again, this antecedent will is considered 1. as nature, insofar as it is the natural and necessary principle of something, as Man wills happiness. 2. as will insofar as it is a principle acting freely and with indifference.

Response 1. Notional acts are voluntary with a concomitant will, because just as by this will God wills Himself to be God, so the Father wills Himself to generate the Son, the Father and the Son will themselves to spirate the Holy Spirit. For the Father does not unwillingly, or by compulsion generate the Son, nor do the Father and the Son unwillingly and by compulsion produce the Holy Spirit. Response 2. notional acts are not voluntary with an antecedent will, considered as it is Will, or a free principle of acting. Proof: What is from an antecedent will as it is will, and free, can not be; but notional acts cannot not be, for the Father could not not generate the Son, nor could the Father and the Son not spirate the Holy Spirit, otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit could not be. Therefore. See this reason in St. Thomas (De Potentia, article 2, ad 4).

Response 3. The production of the Holy Spirit is from the antecedent will, as it is nature: not so the Son, because the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, consequently through the will; the Son proceeds as Word, consequently through the intellect, and thus the Spirit proceeds as the terminus of that will by which the Father and the Son naturally and

necessarily love each other; the Son as the terminus of the intellection, or paternal speaking.

For the solution of objections, note that it is one thing to proceed by way of nature, another to proceed from the will as it is nature. That is said to proceed by way of nature which proceeds as those things which in creatures proceed in nature, and not from the will; What proceeds from nature does not presuppose another action except accidentally, insofar as one natural agent depends on another; what proceeds from the will as nature, per se and always presupposes another procession, because the will does not tend to anything, unless there is a pre-existing production of the intellect conceiving something. Hence the Holy Spirit, proceeding as necessary love, proceeds from the antecedent will as it is nature, or proceeds by way of will, yet does not proceed by way of nature.

Article II. On the comparison of Persons to each other. (St. Thomas, Q. 43)

Question 1. Whether the divine Persons are co-equal? Response: The divine Persons are co-equal to each other. This is of faith. In Philippians 2, the Apostle says of Christ: "He did not consider it robbery to be equal to God." Likewise in the Athanasian Creed, and chapter Firmiter on the Most Holy Trinity. The reason is: equal is said through the negation of greater and lesser: but in God there is not greater and lesser. For unequal things cannot have one quantity in number, but quantity in God is nothing other than His essence: therefore if there were any inequality in the divine persons, there would not be one essence in them, and thus

the three persons would not be one God, which is impossible: therefore.

Hence you will infer 1. The Persons are equal in magnitude and power. The magnitude of God is the perfection of nature; now the nature is the same in number in all, and moreover, the generative power of the Father is not defective, nor does the Son arrive at perfection successively. In power, because the power of acting follows the perfection of nature, which is the same in all. 2. The three Persons are also co-eternal, because they proceed from an agent whose power of acting is always perfect and instantaneous. 3. The three Persons are also similar to each other, because where equality is considered according to quantity of power, equality includes in itself similarity, and something more because of excess. Indeed, all things equal according to quantity of power are similar, but not all similar things are equal, for they can unequally participate in the same form; hence the word 'similar' was rejected in the time of the Arians.

Question 2. Whether in the divine Persons there is an order of nature? Response: affirmatively. Order is always spoken of by comparison to some principle: hence just as a principle is spoken of either according to position, as a point; or according to intellect, as a principle of demonstration; or according to individual causes, so also order is spoken of. But in the divine there is a principle according to origin without priority. Therefore there is order according to origin without priority and posteriority even of nature, because what is posterior in nature to another should depend in its nature on the nature of the other, which cannot be said of the divine persons, of whom there is one nature. Therefore this order is called by Augustine (Book 3 against Maximus, chapter 14) an

order of nature, not by which one is prior to the other, but by which one is from the other.

Question 3. Whether the circumincession of the divine Persons should be admitted? Circumincession is the mutual coexistence of the divine Persons in each other, such that the Father is in the Son, the Son in the Father, both in the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit in both. Response: affirmatively. This is of faith. Christ in John 14 says: "Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?" And frequently the Holy Fathers: Tertullian against Praxeas, chapter 25, Hilary, 8 on the Trinity, Cyril of Alexandria, Book 9 on John, chapter 39, Ambrose, Book 10 on Luke at chapter 30, Jerome in chapter 3 of Ezekiel, Augustine, 6 on the Trinity, final chapter, and others. St. Thomas, Book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 9, and First Part, question 43, article 5, objection. The reason is, because several persons distinct from each other, yet such that one in number is their indivisible nature, with which they are identified, necessarily exist in each other; but the three divine Persons are distinct from each other, yet such that one in number is their nature identified with them; therefore necessarily one is in another, and conversely.

You see that two things are required for mutual indwelling (circumincession). First, the distinction of supposita; for the same suppositum is not said to be in itself, except improperly by reason of parts, which has no place in the divine. Second, the numerical unity of essence; for if the essence were diverse, there would be more perfection in all than in one, and less in one than in all, which also does not belong to the divine persons.

Article III. On the mission of the divine Persons. (St. Thomas, Q. 43)

Question 1. whether it is suitable for any divine person to be sent? Response: affirmatively. In John, chapter 3, it is said: "God sent His Son into the world." Chapter 6, Christ about himself: "The living Father sent me." Chapter 8: "I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me." About the Holy Spirit, ibid. chapter 14: "The Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name." And chapter 15: "The Paraclete, whom I will send to you." The reason is that in the notion of mission two things are imported, one of which is the relation to him by whom he is sent, the other is the relation of the sent to the term to which he is sent: for by the fact that someone is sent, a certain procession of the sent from the sender is shown, either according to command, as a master sends a servant; or according to counsel and persuasion, as if a counselor is said to send a King to war, or a doctor to the baths; or according to origin, as if it is said that a flower is emitted by a tree, brightness by the sun. Likewise a relation is shown to the term to which he is sent, either that he begins to be there where he was not before; or that he begins to be in some new way, in which he was not before; but although mission cannot belong to a divine person according to command or counsel, it can however belong according to what it imports: procession of origin from the sender. Likewise, although on the part of the term it cannot belong according to what it imports to be where it was not before, it can nevertheless belong according to what it imports: a new mode of existing in another; just as the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world according to what he began to

be in the world in a new way through the flesh assumed, and yet he was in the world before, as is said in John 1. Therefore.

Hence you will infer 1. that the mission of the divine Persons can be defined thus: the procession of origin of one Person from another with a new mode of existing in another. 2. that the Father is not sent, because He proceeds from no one; however, He can give Himself, because although no one can send himself, nevertheless one can give oneself. 3. that not every person sends, if mission is taken properly and adequately, but only that one to whom it belongs to be the principle of the one who is sent: because as has been said, mission properly and adequately taken imports two things, namely the origin of the person sent from the sender, and the relation to the term to which he is sent, and thus the Son is sent only by the Father, the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son. If, however, mission is taken improperly and inadequately for the sole relation of the sent to the term or effect to which he is sent, with the precise relation of the sent to him by whom he is sent, then it can be said that the whole Trinity sends, because the whole Trinity works this effect. And according to this sense Augustine is to be understood (Book 2 on the Trinity, chapter 5) where that of Isaiah 48: "The Lord God sent me and His Spirit" is interpreted of the Person of the Word, which he says was sent by the Holy Spirit to be incarnated. Several, however, interpret it of the human nature of Christ, according to which he was sent by the Holy Spirit to preach.

Question 2. whether mission should be said to be eternal or temporal? Response: It must be said to be only temporal, because beyond the relation to an eternal principle, it says relation to a temporal term, through which it is completed in the notion of mission. Therefore it must be

said to be temporal only, just as creation, although its principle is eternal, because nevertheless the effect, which it connotes, is temporal, is not said to be eternal, but temporal.

Question 3. whether the invisible mission of the divine Persons is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace? Note before the response, that mission on the part of the term or temporal effect, which it connotes, is divided into visible and invisible. Visible is that which is made in some sensible effect or sign manifesting the person sent, as when the Word was sent to be incarnated, when the Holy Spirit was sent into the Apostles under the species of fire. Invisible mission is that which is made in some spiritual and invisible effect, such as is made in the justification of a sinner through the gift of grace. These missions, however, differ: 1. that in visible mission one person is sent and manifested without the other, but in invisible mission the two proceeding persons are sent, and although the Father is not sent, nevertheless He comes and communicates Himself to the soul with the others, according to that of Christ in John 14: "If anyone loves me... my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and we will make our abode with him." 2. That visible mission can be made through any visible thing, but invisible through the supernatural gift alone produced in the soul; and since there are various supernatural gifts, such as sanctifying grace, actual help, freely given grace, the gift of faith, etc., the question is whether invisible mission is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace; or whether the soul is disposed and perfected only through sanctifying grace, so that it is a suitable temple and dwelling of the divine person sent; for in mission not graces alone are sent, or given, as I will say presently, but the divine Persons themselves. With these noted, to the question,

Response: Affirmatively: because then a divine Person is sent when He exists in a new way in another; but through sanctifying grace alone a divine Person exists in a new way in man. Therefore. The major is clear from the definition of mission. Proof of the minor: The common mode by which God is in all creatures is through immensity, namely, through essence, presence, and power, as we have said elsewhere; beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode, which belongs to rational nature, by which God is said to be in it, as the known in the knower, and the loved in the lover, when, namely, the rational creature has God invisibly present to itself through grace and charity, and becomes a temple of God and His dwelling. But this is not done except through sanctifying grace and charity, by which man so has God, that he can freely use and enjoy Him as a friend possessed. Therefore.

You will say: God exists in a new way: 1. in faithful sinners through faith and natural love. 2. in penitent sinners through actual graces moving them to acts of contrition. 3. in the Supreme Pontiff and Councils through special assistance in defining matters of faith. Therefore. Response: These three modes do not depart from the common mode of existing in another through immensity, except in a qualified and imperfect way; nor do they attain that new and special mode of existing in another as in a dwelling and temple, and by which the existing thing is so had and possessed by the other, that this other can freely use and enjoy it: this indeed is not had except through charity and perfect friendship. Through faith and natural love, although God is in the soul as the known in the knower and the loved in the lover, nevertheless not by knowledge and love proceeding from charity and perfect friendship, by which the lover so has and

possesses the loved, that he can freely enjoy it. Through actual graces, by which the Holy Spirit moves penitents to acts of contrition, He does not yet dwell in them, as the Council of Trent says (session 14, chapter 14), but only stands at the door and knocks. Similarly, through that special assistance, which is given to the Supreme Pontiff and Councils in defining matters of faith, the Spirit indeed moves and directs the intellect, lest it err, but does not inhabit, hence, as I said, these modes do not depart except in a qualified and imperfect way from the general presence, by which God is in all things through operation.

From these things you gather that an invisible mission of the divine persons is made in man in three ways: First, in the first justification of man; Second, in any increase of grace; Third, in beatitude, in which God will be in the soul in a new and special way through the union of His essence in the reason of an intelligible species.

Question 4. Whether through invisible mission, the divine Persons become substantially present to the soul, so that if by impossibility they were not substantially present through immensity, they would nevertheless be so by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace?

Response: Affirmatively. The first proof proceeds from the authority of Sacred Scripture. In the Epistle to the Romans, chapter five, it is written: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us," wherein a distinction is made between the charity given and the Spirit given. However, Sacred Scripture would distinguish between these two realities in vain, if the Spirit were not substantially present, but only present through the gift of charity alone.

By reason of this kind of presence through the gift of sanctifying grace, the just soul is called the temple of God, as we read in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter three: "Do you not know that you are the temple of God?" This designation, however, cannot be verified of the gifts of grace alone, to which a temple is not consecrated, but only to the divine Persons themselves. For a temple in its proper sense is consecrated and dedicated to the divine Persons, not merely to their created effects or gifts, however excellent these might be.

Gloria Patri, Et Filio, Et Spiritui Sancto.
Sicut Erat In Principio, Et Nunc, Et Semper, Et In
Saecula Saeculorum. Amen.

Summary of the Holy Trinity

In this wonderful exposition, the distinguished Dominican theologian Fr. Charles René Billuart, renowned for his clarity of thought and fidelity to St. Thomas Aquinas, presents a complete scholastic synthesis of the most profound mystery of Christian faith: the Most Holy Trinity.

Written as part of his Summa Summae S. Thomae, this treatise distills centuries of doctrinal precision into a structure both accessible and intellectually rigorous. Billuart begins with a decisive refutation of Trinitarian heresies, defending the Church's faith with clarity and charity. From there, he unfolds the mystery itself; exploring the divine processions, relations, and persons with the discipline of a metaphysician and the reverence of a friar.

Each dissertation probes deeper into the mystery of unity and distinction within the Godhead, addressing the generation of the Word, the procession of the Spirit, the notion of relation in God, and the meaning of personhood in the divine nature. Billuart guides the reader through these intricate questions with unmistakable Dominican order, always returning to the voice of St. Thomas and the Fathers.

More than a summary, this work is a bridge between the classroom and the cloister, offering to students, seminarians, and lovers of sacred doctrine a trustworthy path into the heart of Trinitarian theology. At once a manual of scholastic logic and a meditation on divine love, On the Sacred Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity stands as a testament to the enduring light of Thomistic thought in the service of the Church's greatest mystery.

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Prima Pars Q. 27–43

Claude Sonnet 3.7

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